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Title “Is the European Commission’s recent interpretation of Article 107 (3)(b) 
a departure from established State aid policy on the financial sector?” 
 
 
 
 
Objectives: To briefly review State aid jurisprudence and analyse if the Commission is 
liberally applying State aid to the financial sector. Attempt to measure the 
effectiveness of the tools used by the Commission to limit the aid’s 
negative externalities. 
 
 
 
 
Research Methods: A mixed methodology research approach, utilising both the inductive and 
deductive methods for a broader, in depth investigation of State aid 
through both quantitative and qualitative research methods. 
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Abstract: 
Chapter 3.5 The Credit Lyonnais Application 
To limit the economic damage of State aid the Commission stated that the “aid should be 
proportional to the objectives in question and the amount of aid should be limited to the strict 
minimum needed for restructuring so that the recipient company itself makes a maximum 
contribution to the recovery plan”1 This complies with the 1994 R&R Report. The Commission 
decided in “examining a measure to assist the restructuring of a firm in difficulty, its overall 
assessment (was) to consider whether the common interest is served by the maintenance of the 
firm in business, given the competition that exists in the industry and the way competition will be 
affected by the aid.”2 This “common interest” is the social objective by which the Commission 
currently justifies the use of State aid under Article 107 (3)(b). The Commission concluded “CL 
has received State aid equal to at least twice and possibly even three times its current own funds, 
which amounted to FRF 44 billion in 1997.”3  This had the result of enabling CL to not only 
avoid liquidation but to maintain a strong presence in the market.   
The Commission ensured proportionality via a “quid pro quo” approach. This reduced the State 
aid’s competitive effects. CL would be eligible for the aid however the firm must give something 
in return. The Commission minimised distortions to the Common Market by reducing the market 
share of CL by selling off assets and therefore “serving to offset as far as possible the distortion 
of competition caused by the aid.” 4 The “quid pro quo” has the dual effect of raising funds for 
the beneficiary, through the selling of assets which were then used to finance the restructuring 
effort.  The use of quid pro quo is significant. The Commission in this decision appears to have 
confused proportionality with quid pro quo. The proportionality test ensures aid is minimal,  
proportional and necessary. Quid pro quo is a concept outside the test of proportionality. It 
perpetuates a sense of equivalency, where proportionality imbues a sense of equilibrium. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Commission, Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty OJC368 23/12/1994 at 2.1  
2
 Ibid at 10.5. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Ibid 
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Chapter One  Literature Review 
 
The subject of this thesis is a highly focused, contemporary legal issue. The nature of European 
State aid is such that some economic analysis is necessary to measure the impact of State Aid 
Policy and case law. The literature pertinent to this topic is wide-ranging, covering the broad 
disciplines of economics, political theory and law. Therefore it has been necessary to survey a 
representative sample of the work on all of the issues relevant to this thesis. This thesis seeks to 
link various key topics and issues which have not thus far been examined together, and so the 
scope of the review is broad rather than deep. This review will summarise the leading cases, 
policies and academic works relevant and where necessary, a greater elaboration will be given 
within the thesis. 
This researcher contends that the European Commission’s recent interpretation of Article 107 
(3)(b) is a departure from established State aid policy on the financial sector. 
 
1.1 What is State Aid? 
The most fundamental question in this thesis is: what is state aid? This concept can be 
understood through an examination of EU law, Commission decisions, Commission reports, case 
law and relevant academic literature. 
Article 107 (1) Treaty Functioning European Union 2008 (TFEU) (ex Article 87 (1)) states: 
 “Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or through 
State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by 
favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects 
trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.” 
Article 107(1) provides that State aid is in principle incompatible with the Common Market. 
Article 107 does not expressly define the term “State aid”.  
 
  
9 
However the European Court of Justice (ECJ) held in Italy v Commission5 that: 
“The aim of Article (87) is to prevent trade between Member State from being affected by 
benefits granted by the public authorities which, in various forms, distort or threaten to distort 
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of goods. Accordingly, Article 
(87) does not distinguish between the measures of state intervention concerned by reference to 
their causes or aims but defines them in relation to their effect.” 
This seminal decision requires that the Commission examines “the effect of the measure (rather) 
than its form or the intention of those who grant or receive the aid in question.”6 This allows the 
Commission to apply a “before and after test” to the market, “by carrying out critical analysis of 
the relevant market both prior to, and following the grant of aid.”7 This interpretative ‘we’ll 
know it when we see it approach’ gives the Commission greater independence and greater 
freedom in identifying State aid. Therefore State aid is not expressly defined, but its effects can 
be economically assessed. 
 
1.2 The Vademecum Report 
The Commission’s Vademecum 2008 Report outlines four criteria in categorising State aid.8 
These criteria were developed inline with the Italy v Commission9 decision. 
 
1.2.1 Transfer of state resources 
State aid provisions cover measures involving a transfer of state resources- national, regional, 
local authority, public banks and foundations. This also includes private and public 
intermediate bodies appointed by a State. Financial transfers include grants, interest rate 
rebates, loan guarantees, accelerated depreciation allowances, capital injection and tax 
exemptions. This list is not exhaustive. This was outlined in the broad definition of France v 
Commission, where the European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that “advantages to be capable 
                                                 
5
 Italy v Commission, Case 173/73, [1974] ECR 709 para. 13. 
6
 Flynn L, Permissible Public Intervention in Markets and Substantive EC Law on State Aid ITLR Vol 20 No 6 at 87 
(2002). 
7
 O’Connor H A, The Rights and Wrongs of State Aids 15ILT 29 (1997). 
8
 European Commission, Vademecum, Community law on State aid, Brussels, 2008,   
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/vademecum_on_rules_09_2008_en.pdf> at 19/2/10. 
9
 Italy v Commission, Case 173/73, [1974] ECR 709 para. 13. 
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of being categorised as aid within the meaning of Article 87 (1)EC, they must first be granted 
directly or indirectly through State resources...and, second, be imputable to the State.”10 The 
imputability test of State aid is a new high standard at which the Commission applied to source 
the origins of State aid.  Flynn11 highlights the test used by the ECJ in the Commission v 
France (1985)12 case. It was held “Article (87) covers aid which…..was decided and financed 
by a public body and the implementation of which is subject to the approval of (a) public” 
body. Further to this in the case Pearle & Others13, the ECJ held that the requirement for State 
aid origins has just two elements “direct and indirect use of State resources and the aid is 
imputable to the State.”14  The broad standards used by the Commission allows it a wide 
discretion in identifying State aid. 
 
1.2.2 Economic advantage 
The aid should constitute an economic advantage if it is received outside the normal course of 
business. In the Welsh Public Sector Network Scheme15 case the ECJ defined the concept of 
economic advantage in “which the recipient undertaking would not have received under 
normal market conditions.” This criterion is akin to the traditionally applied Market Economy 
Investors Principle (MEIP).  
The purpose of the MEIP was expressed in the Siciliana Acque Minerali Srl16 case as “to 
ensure respect for the principle of neutrality the aid must be assessed as the difference between 
the terms on which funds were made available by the State to the public enterprise and the 
terms which a private investor would find acceptable in providing funds to a comparable 
private undertaking when the private investor is operating under normal market economy 
conditions” Craig & DeBurca17 define the MEIP standard as “whether the undertaking could 
have obtained the amounts in question on the capital market.”18 Jacques Bourgeois19 argues 
                                                 
10
 France v Commission, C-482/00, [2002] ECR I-4397 para 24. 
11
 L Flynn, “Permissible Public Intervention in Markets and Substantive EC Law on State Aid” [2002] 20 ILT 87 
12
 Commission v France, Case 290/83 (1985) ECR 439. 
13
 Pearle & Others C-345/02 ECR 1-7139 20. 
14
 Steiner,Woods & Twigg-Flesner, EU Law (9th Ed., Oxford, 2006) at 654. 
15
 Commission Decision No 6/2007, Welsh Public Sector Network Scheme-UK. 
16
 Commission Decision No 2000/648/EC  Siciliana Acque Minerali Srl at 16 
17
 Craig & DeBurca, EU Law Texts, Cases and Material” (3rd Ed. Oxford, 2003)  at 1141 
18
 Re Tubemeuse: Belgium v Commission,  C-142/87 [1990] ECR I-959 at 25 
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that the MEIP is too simplistic. The very use of state resources should disqualify State aid 
under the MEIP. Ignoring this, Bourgeois argues that a “benefit” must be felt by the member 
state to qualify the aid under MEIP: “..only advantages which are granted directly or 
indirectly through state resources are to be regarded as state aid within the meaning of Article 
87 (1).”20 This is a low standard because by its very nature, State aid should bestow a benefit 
on the recipient.  Bourgeois highlights in the Credit Lyonnais21 case, the Commission 
considered further factors outside the MEIP, such as the duration of the aid, degree of risk and 
rate of return to analyse the market conditions of the recapitalisation. 
The economic advantage criterion encompasses all areas of MEIP in addition to an analysis of 
normal market conditions. The use of the economic advantage criteria negates the public 
funding versus private funding debate and focuses on the economic market conditions. This 
brings State aid analysis in line with the Competition Rules of Article 101 TFEU (ex Article 
81) and Article 102 TFEU (ex Article 82). 
State aid under Article 107 (3)(b) will always fail the MEIP, national banking guarantees and 
state recapitalisations are by their very nature outside the MEIP. The Commission has had to 
develop further tests to analyse State aid.  If an undertaking fails the MEIP, the Commission 
will apply a selectivity test, failing this the Commission will apply a proportionality test and or 
the newest IAC Test (see all tests below). Although the MEIP is it still used it has little 
application for State aid of this nature.  
 
1.2.3  Selectivity 
State aid is deemed to exist if it is selective in nature. Selectivity exists if authorities 
administering the scheme have discretion over any preferential treatment. The issue of 
selectivity is the “preferential” or “unequal treatment” between competitive organisations. 
Aid applied generally is not categorised as State aid. However the distinction between the two 
types of aid is difficult to determine in practice. Services of general economic interest (SGEI)22 
                                                                                                                                                             
19
 Bourgeois J, EU Rules on State Aids and the WTO Provision on Subsidies Compared European Competition Law 
Annual 1999: Selected Issues in the Fields of State Aid, (1st Ed., Oxford 1999) 
20
 Firma Sloman Neptune Schiffahrts AG v Seebetriebsrat Bodo Ziesemer der Sloman Neptun Schhiffahrts Ag  C-
72/91 and C-73/91 (1993) 
21
 Commission Decision No 95/547/EEC (1996) (Credit Lyonnais) 
22
 Also known as Universal Service Obligations. 
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such as bus services or telecommunications services are a good example of this difficulty. 
SGEIs serve a “fundamental function in all Member States”23 but they are selective by 
definition, one service favoured over another. There was much debate on SGEIs  until the 
seminal decision in the  Almark Trans24 case, where it was held that services of general 
economic interest (SGEI) would not be considered State aid where: 
1. The recipient undertaking must actually have public service obligation to discharge. 
2. The compensation should not exceed costs plus reasonable profit. 
3. The parameters for compensation are objective, transparent, and are established in 
advance. 
4. The tendering process is public. 25 
State aid to the financial sector falls outside the remit of the SGEI because it is beyond the 
parameters set out in Almark Trans. 
The test for selectivity expressed in the Adria-Wien26 case states: “as to favour certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods within the meaning of Article 87 (1) of the 
Treaty in comparison with other undertaking which are in a legal and factual situation that is 
comparable in the light of the objective pursued by the measure in question.” 
The Adria-Wein definition highlights the need for comparability not only within the same 
economic sector but between undertakings pursuing the same objective across the European 
Union. 
 
1.2.4 Effect on Competition & Trade 
Aid must have a potential effect on competition and trade between member states.  This criterion 
is a combination of the traditionally used “distort, or threaten to distort competition” and “effect 
on inter-state trade.” 
 
 
 
                                                 
23
 European Commission, Services of general economic interest and state aid,  Brussels 2002 at  
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/reform/archive_docs/1759_sieg_en.pdf> at 20/03/10. 
24
 Altmark Trans Gmbh, v Nahverkehrsgellschaft, [2003] ECR I-1774. 
25
 Altmark Trans Gmbh, v Nahverkehrsgellschaft, [2003] ECR I-1774. 
26
 Adria-Wien Pipeline and others v Finanzlandesdirektion fur Karnten C-143/99 [2001] ECR I-8365, para. 41. 
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1. Distort/threaten to distort competition 
In the case of Phillip Morris,27 the ECJ held that to distort competition means “that the aid 
strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-
Community trade.” Craig & DeBurca state the requirement that State aid should “distort or 
threaten to distort competition” is unproblematic.28 The use of State aid will by its very nature, 
place the beneficiary in an advantageous position. The Court will consider whether the 
beneficiary of the aid is in a stronger position post State aid injection. 
 
2. Effect on inter-state trade. 
There should be an effect on inter-state trade. The Commission must prove that trade “may” be 
affected. It does not have to prove that trade “was” affected. Further to this, the size of the aid or 
the size of the beneficiary does not exclude the possibility that trade may be affected. 
State aid should have an “effect on inter-state trade” the Commission focuses on the potential 
effect, rather than an actual effect. It is therefore not necessary for the beneficiary to actually be 
involved in inter-state trade. The motivation behind this is “the aid might make it harder for a 
competitor in another Member State to break into the national market.”29 These criteria are so 
closely related that the Commission has recently combined them in the Vademecum Report; “the 
beneficiary must engage in an economic activity and it must operate in a market in which there 
is trade between Member States.”30 This definition is so broad it is difficult to imagine an 
undertaking outside its scope. 
 
1.3 State Aid and the Common Market 
The “integration and the maintenance of a fair competitive market form two central themes of 
the Community.”31 The Commission uses State aid regulation as an economic tool to ensure the 
integration and maintenance of a fair competitive market. State aid regulation is therefore 
intrinsically linked to the Common Market.  
                                                 
27
 Phillip Morris Holland v Commission Case 730/79 (1980) ECR 2671. 
28
 Craig & DeBurca, EU Law  (3rd Ed., Oxford  2003) at 1148 
29
 Steiner,Woods & Twigg-Flesner,  EU Law (9th Ed., Oxford, 2006) at 655 
30
 European Commissions, The application of State aid rules to measure taken in  relation to financial institution in 
the context of the current global financial crisis, (2008, Brussels).   
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/banking_crisis_paper.pdf  >  at 19/02/10 
31
 O Connor H, The rights and wrongs of state aid (1997) 15ILT 29. 
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Politically, State aid regulation is necessary to prevent the member states from “subsidising or… 
supporting domestic actors” which “might be viewed by other member states as beggaring thy 
Community neighbor.”32  Therefore State aid regulation encourages not only economic 
integration but it preserves political integration by limiting the use of unfair domestic economic 
policy. This integration is paramount for an economic union as it serves to promote economic 
and political stability. 
 
In economic terms the use of State aid is justified to correct a market failure. Gual distinguishes 
two categories to justify the use of State aid: 33 
1. Programmes of efficiency: a programme designed to address market failure 
through “efficiency objectives” such as Research & Development (R&D) or 
capital market imperfections in relation to Small to Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs). 
2. Programmes of equity: a programme designed to pursue “equitable objectives” 
such as protecting jobs or income levels. 
This distinction is significant: State aid programmes of efficiency result in an increase of output 
and therefore a lowering of costs to enterprises and to consumers. In contrast equitable State aid 
programmes alter market structures resulting in higher prices and lower competition. Essentially 
programmes of equity distort the market, whilst programmes of efficiency streamline the market. 
This distinction has guided the Commission to discourage the use of equitable State aid 
programmes and encourage the development of efficiency programmes.34 Buigues35 argues that 
it is impossible to strictly categorise the two types of aid in economic terms. There will always 
be positive and negative externalities36 when using equity or efficiency aid programmes. Buigues 
                                                 
32
 Doleys T.J, Fifty Years of Molding Article 87:The European Commission and the Development of EU State Aid 
Policy 2009,<  http://www.unc.edu/euce/eusa2009/papers/doleys_10H.pdf >  at 19/02/2010 
33
 Gual J, Aggregate Targets for State Aid Reduction in the European Union, European Competition Law Annual 
1999: Selected Issues in the Fields of State Aid, (1st Ed., 1999, Oxford). 
34
 The Commission has encouraged the use of “cross industry” or “horizontal  rules” such as Research, Innovation & 
Development, Small to Medium Enterprises, Services of General Economic Interest, Environmental Aid, Training 
Aid, Aid to Female Entrepreneurship, Aid for Disabled Workers and Rescue & Restructuring Aid as part of a trend 
towards efficient aid.   
35Buigues P, State Aid and Market Failure: The Quantification Issue, European Competition Law Annual 1999: 
Selected Issues in the Fields of State Aid, (1st Ed., 1999, Oxford). 
36
 An externality is an external effect, seen or unseen. The best example is atmospheric pollution. 
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therefore recommends the use of a proportionality test. State aid should only be granted if the 
positive externalities outweigh the negative externalities.  Verouden argues that the 
equity/efficiency distinction is not always mutually exclusive.37 Even within an efficiency 
programme the use of State aid by a member state always favours one region/undertaking at the 
expensive of another region/undertaking. This process can be seen in the Credit Lyonnais case38 
where a programme of equity was used for an overall efficiency objective.  Verouden’s argument 
culminates with the idea that if State aid is just used to alleviate a market failure, would it not be 
prudent for governments to use other more direct instruments such as tax, in such instances?  The 
idea although interesting, would not be suitable as a remedy for the current economic crisis. The 
European Commission considers the recapitalisation of credit institutions as a necessary tool to 
fix the financial sector and the wider economy. “The recapitalisation of vulnerable systemically 
relevant financial institutions was recognised....(to encourage) the stability of the (economic) 
system.”39 State aid is an appropriate response for a market failure within the banking system 
because of the speed with which aid can be granted (compared to the effect of reducing taxes) 
and in the case of banking guarantees because of the authority and sovereignty that only a 
government can provide. Aid given from another source would not have the same meaning or 
impact. “Among the best security which can be given to bank lenders or bond investors is the 
guarantee of the government of an OECD member.”40  
  
The distinction between types of State aid is important because it has allowed the Commission to 
develop better targeted State aid. However it must be recognised that recapitalisation 
programmes and banking guarantees are programmes of equity and not the traditional efficiency 
programmes encouraged by the Commission.  NAMA is a programme of equity with the social 
objective of stabilising the financial sector (an efficiency aim).   “Officials expect Nama to 
                                                 
37Verouden V, EC State Aid Control:An Economics Perspective, (1st Ed., Cambridge,2006). 
38
 Commission Decision 95/547/EEC 1996 (Credit Lyonnais) 
39
 European Commissions, The application of State aid rules to measure taken in  relation to financial institution in 
the context of the current global financial crisis, (Brussels, 2008). 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/banking_crisis_paper.pdf  >  at 19/02/10 
40
 Ehlermann & Everson, Unapproved State Guarantee for Bank Loans and Other Borrowings :Legal and Policy 
Issues” European Competition Law Annual 1999: Selected Issues in the Fields of State Aid,(1st Ed., Oxford,1999,). 
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recover EUR 4 billion from selling properties and other assets”41per annum. Selling of these 
properties will increase the supply of property on the market and will therefore suppress the price 
of Irish property and the market’s overall recovery. It is this type of market distortion that the 
Commission through Article 107 (3)(b) has traditionally endeavoured to avoid.  This is evidence 
that the Commission has moved away from its traditional position on State aid policy. 
 
1.4 Exemptions to State Aid 
Where State aid is deemed to exist by the Commission or ECJ, member states may apply under 
the exemptions to Article 107 (1) via Article 107 (2) or Article 107 (3). 
Article 107(1) provides that State aid is in principle incompatible with the Common Market. 
Article 107 (2) provides exemptions from Art 107(1) in the areas of socio-economic aid42, 
environmental aid43 and economic aid for German reunification44  
“Article 107 (2)(1) states: “The following shall be compatible with the internal market: 
(a) aid having a social character, granted to individual consumers, provided that such aid is 
granted without discrimination related to the origin of the products concerned; 
(b) aid to make good damage caused by natural disaster or exceptional occurrences; 
(c) aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany affected 
by the division of Germany, in so far as such aid is required in order to compensate for 
the economic disadvantages caused by that division.”  
Craig & DeBurca state the socio-economic aid exemption is limited for use where “there is no 
discrimination, as to the good’s origin.”45 Since most State aid is directed at a particular 
undertaking, the exemption will not apply. 
The exemption under Article 107 (2)(b) covers State aid for environmental disasters.  The ECJ 
laid down the test in Olympiaki v Commission46 as “only damage caused by natural disasters or 
                                                 
41
 Carswell S, The anatomy of Nama, The Irish Times 13/1/09 < www.irishtimes.com/focus/2009/nama-
explained/index.pdf> 23/05/10 
42
 Article 107 (2)(a). 
43
 Article 107 (2)(b). 
44
 Article 107 (2)(c). 
45
 Craig & DeBurca, EU Law Texts, Cases and Materials (2003 3rd Ed. Oxford)  at 1146. 
  
17 
exceptional occurrences may be compensated for under that provision.” The recent volcano 
activity affecting the airline industries would be a good candidate under this type of aid. Finally 
Article 107 (2)(c) provides for the economic position of Germany, as a result of German 
Reunification. Craig & DeBurca state that it is a self-defined provision with limited 
application.47 
 
Article 107(3) outlines broad areas for exemptions to Article 107(1). 
Article 107(3)(a) states: “aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard 
of living is abnormally low or where there is a serious underemployment, and of the regions 
referred to in Article 349, in view of their structural, economic and social situation.” 48 This 
Article provides for acceptable aid in areas of “substandard living” or “serious 
underemployment.” This Article allows State aid or “national regional aid”49 for socio economic 
disadvantaged areas of the European Union. The wording of the Article expresses the serious 
level at which the State aid be implemented where the “living (standard) is abnormally low or 
where there is a serious under employment.”50 State aid granted under this Article must be “used 
sparingly, be proportional and concentrated on the most disadvantaged regions.”51 Furthermore 
the economic advantages gained by the State aid must outweigh the distortions to competition. 
The Commission has published a formula52 outlining the criteria for granting aid under this 
exception. The formula includes population density and unemployment levels between regions at 
both a national and Community level. The Article is interpreted at a pan European level rather 
                                                                                                                                                             
46
 Olympiaki Aeroporia Ypiesies AE v Commission, [2008] Case T-268/06, 2008 
47
 Craig & DeBurca, EU Law Texts, Cases and Materials (3rd Ed. Oxford, 2003) at 1147. 
48
 Article 107 3 (d) and (e) do not have economic applications and are therefore outside the remit of this thesis. 
49
 Craig & DeBurca, EU Law Texts, Cases and Materials (3rd Ed. Oxford, 2003) at 1147. 
50
 Ibid  at 1147. 
51
 European Commission, Guidelines on National Regional Aid, Brussels, 1998 OJ C74/6.< http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:054:0013:0044:EN:PDF > at 19/02/2010. 
52
 Ibid. 
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than a national level-“the Commission looks not to national levels of employment and income but 
to the standard of the Community as a whole.”53   
 
Article 107 (3)(b) contains two separate exemptions to State aid: 
1. Aid “to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest”   
This Project Exemption was outlined in the Glaverbel v Commission54case, here the ECJ held 
that a project may not be described as being a European Project unless “it forms part of a 
transnational European programme supported jointly be a number of governments of the 
Member States…or to combat a common threat such as environmental pollution.” Therefore 
only coordination of aid between European governments would qualify aid under this provision. 
 
2.  Aid to “remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”.   
The use of this Article has increased since the financial crisis began in September 2008. The 
Commission has “recognised that the severity of the crisis justified the granting on the basis 
of”55  Article 107 (3)(b). This Article allows State aid for sectors experiencing a systemic failure 
or crisis. 
Craig & DeBurca highlight the traditional rare utilisation of Article 107 (3)(b) since “the 
economic problems must afflict the whole of the national economy.” 56 Steiner states the 
Commission’s primary concern “is to prevent the grant(ing) of State aid from exacerbating 
existing problems” and “from transferring them from one State to another.” 57 Steiner states that 
the Commission will “not allow Member States to shore up obsolete structures” or “grant relief 
to rescue firms which are incapable of adjusting to conditions of competition.” 58 The 
Commission will allow aid from “supporting bodies....to support financial agencies, through the 
maintenance and guarantee obligations, on a sectoral basis...to compensate for disadvantages 
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incurred by the agencies by virtue of the fulfilment of their public function.”59 This gives the 
Commission a wide discretion to grant State aid to bodies with a public function.  
 
The Commission has published a series of Reports60 (the Crisis Framework (below at 1.5))61 to 
“set out a coherent framework” to ensure “a level playing field between”62 member states.  
Steiner highlights that aid will only be permitted to “sound economic structures, to enable an 
industry to become competitive, to resolve underlying problems (and) not to postpone or shift the 
solution.”63 This is reinforced in the Commission’s Recap Report “it would not be justified to 
keep a firm artificially alive in a sector with long term structural overcapacity or when it can 
only survive as a result of repeated State intervention.” 64 
Craig & DeBurca stress that the aid may be given to a particular region or industry and the need 
for the aid may be at a “national and not just a Community dimension.”65 This provision is 
unique, as all other exemptions are judged at a pan European level. 
 
1.5       The Crisis Framework 
The Commission has published a “Crisis Framework.” This guides the member states in a 
uniform response to the financial crisis in the area of State aid.  “The application of State aid 
rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global 
financial crisis”66 (the Banking Communication) was the first report published since the 
beginning of the current economic crisis. The Banking Communication provides a framework for 
recapitalisation, banking guarantee schemes and ad hoc measures compatible with State aid. 
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Gibson-Bolton67 states the Banking Communication was published in direct response to the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers. Before the publication of the Banking Communication the “banks 
became even more reluctant to lend to one another.”68  The Banking Communication resulted in 
an “almost unprecedented basis for approvals”69 authorised by the Commission under Article 
107(3)(b). The Banking Communication emphasizes the difficulties faced not only by ailing 
banks, but also by banks that are fundamentally sound and are facing a crisis stemming from the 
collapse of the inter-bank credit market. This distinction has major consequences for Irish banks 
involved with the National Assets Management Agency (NAMA). It indicates that a bank’s 
survival is not guaranteed under NAMA.  
The Commission is not obliged to grant State aid to every bank. Petersen states that the 
Commission has historically allowed banks to collapse. “It has demonstrated its conviction that 
state aid can be avoided in most cases through the swift and resolute intervention of 
the....Central Bank.”70 This is evidenced by the collapse of Barings and BCCI.  
The Banking Communication quickly differentiates between State aid applications for 
“individual undertakings or a group of undertakings or an ailing sector” under Article 107 
(3)(c) and aid under Article 107 (3)(b); “aid undertaken to address this systemic crisis.”71 This 
reinforces the distinct application of the Articles 107 (3)(b) and Article 107 (3)(c). The 
Commission utilised a three pronged proportionality test to investigate Ireland’s application for a 
Banking Guarantee under Article 107 (3)(b).72  The test consisted of: 
• Appropriateness: the aid is targeted to remedy a serious disturbance in the entire 
economy. 
• Necessity: the aid is the minimum amount necessary to achieve its objective 
• Proportionality: the negative externalities to competition are balanced against the positive 
effects of the measure. 
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The Commission did not raise an objection under Ireland’s application for State aid. The three 
pronged test reiterates the proportionality test favoured by Craig & DeBurca and Buiges. 
Barrett highlights the importance of the temporary nature73 of any State aid. The Irish Banking 
Guarantee Scheme will run until 29th September 2010.74 Barrett argues that another scheme will 
be needed to replace the current Guarantee, but the range and depth would not be as drastic “it 
seems unlikely that such a scheme would necessitate the same comprehensive re-shaping of 
Ireland's existing legal framework”75 (see further information in 5.2). 
 
The “Temporary Community framework for State aid measures to support access to finance in 
the current financial and economic crisis” (Recap Report)76 reinforces the idea that 
recapitalisation of the banks are central to the recovery of the financial sector. Any financial 
interventions have to be decided at a national level but within a “coordinated (European) 
framework.”77  However the Commission expresses caution on the assumption that fully 
recapitalised banks automatically start lending into the real economy. The Commission states 
any intervention should be “well targeted to guarantee that banks resume their normal lending 
activities.”78 The Recap Report culminates by stating the two central objectives of any state 
intervention. Firstly, to “unblock bank lending to companies and thereby guarantee continuity in 
their access to finance”79 and secondly, to “to encourage companies to continue investing 
in...sustainable growth.”80 
             
The Commission’s Community Guidelines on State aid for Rescuing and Restructuring firms in 
difficulty (R&R Report) 81 is a useful comparison to the Crisis Framework because it has been 
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developed under Article 107 (3)(c) applications since 1994.  This Report has been updated and 
extended since 1994 in response to the needs of “firms in difficulty”82in both periods of 
economic growth and contraction.83 The proportionality test was codified in the 1994 R&R 
Report. However it’s effect was limited to a one undertaking under Article 107 (3)(c). The use of 
the proportionality test at a systemic level is untested. In theory, there is no limit to the amount of 
State aid that could be granted under Article 107 (3)(b) (see discussion in section 4.1). The R&R 
Report is also significant because the newer guidelines listed under Article 107 (3)(b)84 are 
converging with the older guidelines listed under the R&R Report (under Article 107 (3)(c)). 
This hybridisation of the guidelines is further evidence of a dilution of the traditional position of 
the European Commission regarding Article 107 (3)(b). 
 
The Commission’s Report on the “Treatment of Impaired Assets in the Community Banking 
Sector” (IAC)85 was published in response to the “popularity..of governments reducing banks’ 
exposure to so-called toxic assets by purchasing”86 the assets and isolating them. 
The IAC highlights the need for a “common and co-ordinated Community approach”87 through 
boosting market confidence, limiting negative spillovers among member states, protecting the 
single financial market and ensuring compliance with State aid regulations.  Barrett highlights 
“the Directive 2009/14/EC requires that the minimum coverage under deposit-guarantee 
schemes should be €50,000 per depositor”88 and “Ireland has elected at this time to prescribe a 
minimum amount of deposit guarantee protection (€100,000).”89 This spillover effect is 
prohibited under IAC.90 Ireland was allowed a greater level because of the advent of financial 
crisis under Article 107 (3)(b).The Commission is currently examining the €50,000 limit 
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provided under Directive 2009/14/EC. This European limit is expected to be increased to match 
the Irish limit. 
 This is to be decided by December 31st 2010.91 If the Commission does not increase the level, 
Ireland will have to decrease the Banking Guarantee level inline with the Directive 2009/14/EC, 
thereby nullifying any economic spillover. This will effect any extension to the Irish Guarantee 
Scheme under the CIFS (see discussion in 5.2) 
        
The IAC also calls on banks to be wound up if there is a situation of “technical insolvency 
without State intervention.”92 This will have a huge impact on the beneficiaries of NAMA. 
There is evidence that three of the six institutions are insolvent (see 4.1). The Commission by 
granting aid to insolvent firms will have departed from its newly created Crisis Framework. The 
IAC also reiterates the proportionality test laid out by the R&R Report. Therefore the 
Commission advocates the express use of the proportionality test under Article 107 (3)(b). 
However as evidenced below, there is an issue in the appropriate use of the proportionality test 
under Article 107 (3)(b) (see discussion in 4.1 & 4.7).  
 
In conclusion a review of the pertinent official documentation and academic literature in this area 
expresses that the Commission uses State aid as an economic tool rather than an outright 
prohibited act. Extensive economics analysis has guided the Commission to encourage better 
methods of State aid which will benefit rather than hinder the Common Market. The 
Commission’s Vademecum Report outlines the current criteria for State aid. The criteria 
compress thirty years of State aid into four factors.  The Commission has advocated the use of up 
to date economic tools such as the proportionality test and the MEIP all within a recently 
published Crisis Framework.  
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Chapter Two  The Economics of State aid  
EU State aid control is an essential part of competition policy and ensures uniform regulation of 
the Single European Market.  Article 107 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) provides a framework for the use of State aid by member states. The use of State aid by 
a member state would firstly give an unfair competitive advantage to that member state and by 
doing so would threaten the Single European Market. “State aid rules, first and utmost, ensure a 
level playing field for European companies.”93 Secondly, strict regulation of State aid prevents 
the use of protectionist policies and averts the creation of a subsidy race amongst member states. 
The Commission encourages member states “to solve structural problems rather than merely 
masking them.”94 The member states must focus on adapting internal demand, division of labour 
and/or increase the efficiency of production through research and development.  Thirdly the 
Commission recognises State aid as an effective tool that can be used to prioritise regional 
development and more recently combat distressed sectoral development. These tools include the 
development of the State Aid Action Plan95, the use of block exemptions96 and the de minis 
doctrine.97   
The resulting levels of pan European State aid have fallen by around 2% of GDP per annum 
for the last ten years and were at 0.5% in 2007.98 The unemployment rate fell over the same 
period at was 7% EU-wide in 2008. Budget deficits decreased and EU-wide GDP has grown by  
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1.5% per annum in the same period.99 The steady decrease of the overall levels of State aid since 
1997100 is a result of: 
• Economic growth had impacted in less rescue and restructuring State aid for ailing firms. 
• Coal Sector State aid had continued to decrease in Poland, France, Germany and Spain 
• Successful pre-accession and post-accession commitments by members states that joined 
in or after 2004. 
Ultimately the reasons for the decrease have been from the Commission’s tough stance on State 
aid on the industrial sectors and the restructuring of State aid by the accession states as a term of  
membership of the EU. 
 
 
 2.1 The Financial Crisis and State Aid 
The financial crisis in September 2008 caused an abrupt end to this decade of prosperity. 
Unemployment rose to 9% by July 2009, the EU-wide GDP has fallen by approximately 4% in 
2009.101 The use of State aid has increased as member states injected aid to stabilise their 
economies. The EU-27 injected EUR 212.2 billion or 1.7% GDP in State aid in 2008.102 
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It is worth noting that although overall levels of State aid have increased (pink line), the levels of 
pre crisis aid have continued to decrease (purple line). The increase in State aid is due to member 
states’ crisis measures and in particular State aid measures within domestic financial sectors. 
Fig 1 Total aid as  % of GDP EU-27103   
 
2.2 The Financial Sector 
The Commission views a stable banking system as “key to provide the economy with liquidity… 
in the form of credit.”104 The member states have injected vast amounts of aid to shore up their 
financial sectors. Ireland has contributed EUR 376 billion into the Banking Guarantee and the 
total EU-27 contributions was approximately EUR 3044.6 billion105 from 2008 to 2009.   
The speed and uncertainty of the financial crisis has left the Commission struggling to process 
Article 107 exemption applications. “These… exceptional times are making new demands on the 
state aid system and… we have room to manoeuvre as we figure our way through this crisis.”106  
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Several member states have described State aid policy as a barrier to recovery. Swedish Minister 
of Finance Anders Borg said “we have to call off these legions of state aid bureaucrats.”107 
 
There is a balance between a member state’s request for State aid and the Commission’s power 
to authorise that aid. If the Commission rejects or is to slow to authorise State aid, the member 
states might:  
1. Rebel from the Commission’s authority and implement the aid. 
2. Await a long term answer and the beneficiary of the State aid might fail.  
The first scenario would undermine the position of the Commission and would cause both 
political and legal EU wide damage. The second scenario would cause political and economic 
damage at a domestic level and undermine the ‘l’esprit de l’Union europeenne’. Further to both 
of these scenarios, the ‘realpolitik’ might obligate a member State to grant State aid regardless. 
The financial crisis has acutely highlighted this balance and the Commission has reacted with the 
publication of the Crisis Framework outlining State aid policy in particular sectors (discussed at 
4.1).  
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Chapter Three The development of Article 107 (3)(b) 1971-2007 
 
The parameters for State aid have developed incrementally through a combination of case law, 
the Commission’s decisions and the Commission’s frameworks. The development of State aid 
has been tied closely to the economic growth of the European Community. This chapter analyzes 
banking guarantees, credit facilities and “ring fencing” models utilised by the member states 
since 1971.108 In addition other State aid trends have been included where relevant to this 
dissertation. 
From 1971 to 1994 the Commission gradually extended State aid policy to accommodate the 
deteriorating economic circumstances of the member states. The Commission limited the State 
aid applications within programmes of efficiency. This limit was passed only on two 
extraordinary occasions, the 1975 Energy Crisis and the 1978 Belgian Economic Crisis, on both 
occasions the Commission tempered the effects of the State aid. In 1994 the Commission 
abandoned the equity/efficiency in favour of a proportionality test applied in the Credit Lyonnais 
case. This marked a new direction in State aid regulation. However the appropriateness of the 
proportionality test on the services sector is at question (see below). 
Despite the distinct functions of Articles 107 (3)(b) and (3)(c), there is an overlap in the 
development of these Articles. Whilst Article 107 (3)(b) is concerned with remedying “a serious 
disturbance in the economy of a Member State” Article 107 (3)(c)’s remit is to “facilitate the 
development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does 
not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.” Therefore 
Article 107 (3)(b) applies at a national level, whereas Article 107 (3)(c) applies on a sectoral 
level. There is evidence of a convergence of the criteria used to assess these Articles. Article 
107(3)(c) has been used by the member states with greater frequency and therefore it has been 
developed further.  In contrast Article 107(3)(b) is rarely used and is it not as evolved. This 
convergence will be further discussed below.  For this reason both Articles have been included in 
this analysis. 
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 The majority of the earliest cases were investigated by the Commission under Article 108 TFEU 
(ex Article 93 2) “The Commission shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its 
comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid…the Member State concerned shall not put its 
proposed measures into effect until this procedure has resulted in a final decision.” 
The considerable use of Article 108 (ex Article 93 (2)) resulted from the Commission’s initial 
political struggle to regulate State aid. This struggle dominated the Commission’s early rulings 
up until the Belgium v Commission109 in 1986 (discussed below). This ruling confirmed the 
Commission’s position as State aid regulator by the European Court of Justice. 
 
3.1 1970-1979 
One of the earliest State aid cases involved Belgium in 1971.110 In this case, it was initially 
agreed that State aid would be given from “Societe Nationale de Credit a l’Industrie” of up to 
BF 800 million to “enterprises in difficulty.” When the fund ran out, the Government granted 
credits to enterprises in difficulties directly from the Ministry of Economic Affairs’ budget. The 
Commission decided that aid was incompatible with the Common Market where:  
 
1. “as with all aid to enterprises in difficulty, it effected competition and trade by 
preventing the consequences of normal play of the market through artificially keeping 
enterprises alive which could encumber that structure of sectors facing adaptation 
difficulties and which, in order to stay on the market, might act in such manner as 
seriously to disturb the market.” 
 
2. “it fell within the framework of general aid systems and was, therefore, likely to help all 
enterprises, regardless of sector or geographical location. It was therefore impossible for 
the Commission to assess its effect.” 
 
3. “its aim was essentially conservatory in that the purpose was to prevent the closing down 
of enterprises, and leading to unemployment. No definite undertaking was required from 
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the recipients of the credits as regards an effort at adaptation that would enable the 
enterprises to resume a position which would be competitive.” 111 
 
State aid in this case was found to be incompatible with the Common Market. The decision 
shows that State aid: 
• must not artificially keep an enterprise alive 
• must be sector specific and measurable within that sector  
• the beneficiary must undertake action in order to resume a normal unaided trading 
position.  
The Commission justified the aid to prevent the economic problems in Belgium spreading to 
Europe. Today this justification is known as the “social objective” and it is the deciding factor in 
State aid. This decision is the starting point from which this researcher will compare all 
subsequent decisions. 
 
In 1972 the Commission considered an Article 107 (3)(b) application (ex Art 92 (3)(b)) of the 
Italian Law No 184.  The Italian Law No 184 of 22 March 1971 provided for Government 
intervention “to encourage the restructuring and the conversion of certain industrial 
undertakings”112 through the creation of two enterprises: 
1. The Instituto Mobiliare Italiano (IMI) which facilitated restructuring programmes 
to modernize or merge undertakings. The IMI controlled a Lit 40,000 million fund 
provided by the central government. 
 
2. The Gestione e Participazioni Industriali (GEPI) set up several semi state 
companies designed to reorganise and advise firms in difficulty. The GEPI 
controlled a Lit 111,000 million fund. The GEPI was able to acquire temporary 
holdings in enterprises in difficulty and provide preferential credit treatment.113  
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The Commission’s primary concern was the general application of preferential credit through the 
GEPI. “Such credit was of general scope and could be granted to encourage investment by firms 
completely irrespective of their location or of the industry to which they belong.”114 However 
despite this concern, the Commission granted the application on the basis that “the firms 
concerned might have been forced to….close down altogether; this would have been bound to 
worsen further an economic and social climate which is already unfavourable” and that “the 
aim is to cope with essentially transitional difficulties which should disappear once the economic 
recovery expected is under way”115 In this case, the Commission interpreted 107 (3)(b) 
generously fearing a worsening of the economic climate. Significantly the aid was temporary in 
nature (a duration of a year) and the actions were designed to remedy a serious economic 
difficulty. 
 
GEPI and IMI’s temporarily acquired several private enterprises. The Commission allowed this 
where: 
1. the central authority confines itself to the acquisition of certain firms with 
specified terms, duration and purpose. 
2. the acquisitions are not general but confined to particular industries. 116 
Even from this early point, the Commission allowed the ring fencing of bad assets within a well 
defined central authority confined within a clear remit.  
 
3.1.1 Transparency of GEPI and IMI 
The Commission implemented for the first time the requirement of a regular reporting system 
from a member state. There are also early signs of the conception of the transparent aid principle, 
which appears in the form of “the manner in which IMI and GEPI acquisitions were…liquidated 
and the development of the financial situations of the firms concerned…and any other advantage 
the firms may have gained elsewhere.” 117 
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The principle of transparency requires that impact of the aid must measurable. “Thus the 
intensity and duration of the aid…must be commensurate with the degree of importance of the 
aid.”118 The principle of transparency shows early indications that the Commission was 
attempting to balance State aid invested vis-a-vis the impact on the market. This is used today as 
part of the test of proportionality. The use of a regular transparent reporting system will enable 
the Commission through “post facto knowledge”119 to determine the effects of State aid. The 
Commission’s ability to judge the effects of aid using only “post facto knowledge” highlights the 
limited use of economic forecasting by the Commission in 1972. 
 
3.1.2 State Aid and banking guarantees 
The use of a banking guarantee by the Netherlands tested State aid regulation in 1973. The 
Netherlands guaranteed financial transactions through Nationale Investeringsbank (NIB). State 
guarantees may be given if they are in the interests of the national economy as a whole. Despite 
existing as a general application of State aid, they are not directly incompatible with State aid 
policy. In this case, the State Guarantee was deemed to be within the remit of State aid where the 
result “grants a form of official aid to those undertakings receiving support.”120 Further to this 
the Commission stated that despite the “benefit represented by the guarantee is of a qualitative 
nature and cannot be quantified,”121 it is not a barrier for an Article 107 (3)(c) application. The 
impact of a guarantee is unquantifiable and it is a general application of State aid. Banking 
guarantees are therefore an exception under State aid regulation. However the ability of a 
guarantee to stabilize an economy is unparalleled. The cental issue surrounding banking 
guarantees is when they are used in conjunction with other types of State aid  most commonly in 
rescue and recapitalisation State aid. Historically banking guarantees have obligated the member 
states to recapitalise any and all firms in difficulty (as discussed in the Credit Lyonnais case at 
3.5 and Anglo Irish decision at 4.6, 4.7 & 4.8).     
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It is significant to note that the Commission examined the NIB State Guarantee under Article 
107 (3)(c) rather than Art 107 (3)(b), as the guarantee was deemed “within the framework either 
of sectoral or regional programmes or in respect of specific programmes concerning a specific 
undertaking.”122 Therefore its remit was limited. The Commission will therefore consider the 
economic circumstances surrounding a member state before granting aid under 107 (3)(c) rather 
then at a Community level. 
 
3.2 The Energy Crisis of 1975 
The economic difficulties of 1975 heralded a new determination by the Commission in State aid 
regulation. The Commission introduced a “new coordinated machinery ….of differentiated 
ceilings of aid intensity, transparency, regional specificity, the sectoral repercussions of regional 
aid and a system of supervision”123 The European Council agreed Economic Policy Guidelines 
where “Member States which have a balance of payments surplus must implement an economic 
policy of stimulating a domestic demand and maintaining a high level of employment, without 
creating new inflationary conditions.”124 This is consistent with Article 108 (2) (ex Article 93 
(2)) “on application by a Member State, the Council may, acting unanimously, decide that aid 
which that State is granting or intends to grant shall be considered to be compatible with the 
internal market.” However this is subject to Article 108 (3) (ex Article 93 (3)) “if (the 
Commission) considers that any such plan is not compatible with the internal market having 
regard to Article 107, it shall without delay”, abolish or alter such aid. The Commission 
recognised the need for Article 107 (3)(b) intervention was “justified in boosting investment by 
granting firms financial benefits in the form of tax deductions or low-interest loans on an 
automatic or quasi general basis for a limited period.”125 
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The Commission granted the member states’ schemes with the general requirements that the aid: 
• does not artificially extend the life of an ailing firm. 
• the beneficiary does not expand production capacity. 
• the problems are not shifted to another member state or industry. 
• the aid is accompanied by the implementation of restructuring operations. 
• it fulfils genuine and important requirements with regard to employment. 
The overall social objective was to stabilise the member states economies and prevent further 
stagnation. 
 
France commenced an aggressive State aid scheme which involved: 
• A subsidy of 10% of the value of the firm orders for capital goods or tools for 
agricultural, commercial, craft businesses or industrial undertakings. 
• Long term financing assistance to help firms carry out investment programmes- to 
increase capacity, create new jobs or conserve energy. The fund is FF5500 million 
and long term loans can be granted for up to 15 years. 
The Commission found the economic measures utilized by the French Government were in line 
with the European Council’s “adjustments to the economic policy guidelines for 1975.”126 The 
Commission required prior notification to be given for cases “where long-term subsidized 
interest loans were granted.”127 The 15 year duration of the loans are significant in the 
development of State aid. The Commission until then required any State aid schemes be 
temporary in nature, of less than two years. This tempered the uncompetitive effects of State aid. 
The unusual presence of the European Council underlines the Commission’s motivation to grant 
this extraordinary duration.  It should also be noted that the French scheme was a programme of 
economic efficiency, encouraging the use of R&D, modernisation of machinery and energy 
conservation. Therefore the State aid granted was consistent with the Commission’s Economy 
Policy on State Aid.   
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From 1976 there is a shift away from general applications of State aid, towards a more specified, 
“aid to employment” or “aid to exports.”  The Commission discouraged the use of general State 
aid applications where: 
1. There is no specific relationship to the beneficiary industries or beneficiary 
regions.  
2. The Commission cannot assess or measure general applications of State aid. 
3. General aid programmes can infringe on specified aid programmes. 
 
In 1979 this trend towards specified aid was criticised by the Commission on the grounds that it 
was still too general.128 State aid is incompatible with the Common Market, where it is being 
used to keep the status quo, such as maintaining employment levels. Further to this, aid for 
employment is not an economic activity itself and therefore would not fall under the economic 
exemptions of Article 107.  
 
In 1978 the Commission challenged Belgium under “firms in difficulty” through Article 107 
(3)(b) on the Clause 75 of the Belgian Act on economic and budgetary reform.  The Belgian 
Clause provides credit for viable “firms in difficulty in the form of repayable advances, ordinary 
loans and convertible loans.”129 The Commission agreed to grant the aid to cases not involving a 
restructuring plan where: 
1. “if the closure of the firm would cause particularly acute social or industrial problems. 
2. to the extent necessary to maintain the day to day operation of the firm concerned. 
3. for a period not exceeding, in principle, six months, the period only to be exceeded in 
exceptional cases with prior Commission agreement. 
4. in the forms of loans at market rates of interest.”130  
 
This is marked departure from State aid policy. The exemptions granted by the Commission are 
very broad and would be common in any recession. However the State aid was tempered by a six 
month limit. The use of “loans at market rates of interest” is an early form of the Market 
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Economy Investors Principle (MEIP). The MEIP is commonly used today to assess State aid 
applications. 
 
From 1971 to 1979 the Commission was willing to depart from precedent in two circumstances, 
firstly, in 1975 when the European Council intervened in extraordinary economic circumstances 
and secondly, in the 1978 Belgium Application however this was limited by a six month 
duration. 
 
3.3 Further economic difficulties of 1980-1990 
In 1980, the seminal Philip Morris BV v Commission131 case challenged the ability of the 
Commission to regulate State aid. The ECJ held “it should be borne in mind that the 
Commission has a discretion the exercise of which involves economic and social assessments 
which must be made in Community context.”132  This ruling places the economic and social 
assessment of State aid firmly within the Commission’s remit.  
 
The Commission also introduced the controversial Transparency Directive.133 “The Commission 
sought to require governments to make available upon request, information on financial 
transactions concerning the nature and effect of their links with public undertakings.”134 Several 
member states challenged this directive and the Commission’s legislative ability.135  The ECJ 
held that under Article 189 “the Commission, just as the Council, has the power to issue 
directives in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.”136 This decision and the decision in 
Belgium v Commission [1986] (below) crystallised the Commission’s role as regulator and 
enforcer of State aid. Post Belgium v Commission [1986], there is a reduction in Article 108 
Commission investigations. 
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In 1981 the Commission expanded the criteria of State aid to include: 
1. “the use of State aid by a Member State must not lead to the transfer of industrial 
difficulties and unemployment from that Member State to the rest of the Community. 
2. where aid is given, it must bring about the restoration of the health of the recipient 
undertaking so that it can within a reasonable period of time, be expected to operate 
viably without further aid. 
3. any aid permitted should be so structured (so) that (its effects) are transparent.”137 
 
The first criteria, reinforces the Philip Morris BV138 judgement, the consideration of State aid as 
a Community issue not a national one. The second criterion summaries what the Commission has 
and is currently trying to achieve; a return to viability within a reasonable period of time. The 
third criterion emphasizes the 1975 Commission’s idea of transparency.  
The Commission also in 1981 began the use of the MEIP to analyse whether an “economic 
advantage” was bestowed on the beneficiary. “The test is whether or not the State is supplying 
the recipient undertaking with an economic advantage that it could not have obtained under 
normal market conditions.”139 This was first expressed in the Shipbuilding Directive140 as aid 
“which they directly or indirectly control and which do not count as the provision of risk capital 
according to standard company practice in a market economy” and was later applied to all areas 
of State aid. The MEIP was accepted by the ECJ in the seminal case of Belgium v Commission 
[1986], the ECJ held that the MEIP is “an appropriate way to determine the existence of aid.”141  
 
In 1985 the Commission introduced several mechanisms to simplify and streamline applications 
for State aid. The Commission firstly introduced the Research & Development Framework 
(R&D). R&D  State aid was then “one of the largest...form(s) of intervention by government(s) in 
support of industry.”142 The introduction of the R&D Framework was the beginning of a trend of 
codification of the exemptions to Article 107 (ex Article 92). However the Commission added 
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the caveat that “state aids to R&D, as is the case with any form of State aids are notifiable under 
Article 93(3).”143 The R&D Framework gave the member states greater independence in utilising 
State aid but it maintained the Commission’s position as state aid regulator. The Framework 
encouraged programmes of efficiency, and therefore promoted the Commission’s State aid 
Economic Policy.  
The Commission also introduced the de minimis doctrine through the Transparency Directive, 
Directive 85/413.144  This doctrine exempted public undertakings with an annual turnover of less 
that 40 million ECU’s from State aid regulation. This further exemplifies the Commission’s 
trend towards increasing access to State aid through the codification of State aid exceptions.  
 
In 1987 the Greek financial crisis prompted the Commission to allow an application under 
Article 107 (3)(b) (ex Article 92 (3)(b)) to “remedy a serious disturbance of the economy of a 
Member State.”  The Greek Economy had been contracting since 1985.145 Two years later, the 
Business Reconstruction Organisation (BRO) was charged to “provide State aid for companies 
subject to such interventions (to convert) outstanding debts into equity (relieving) them of a high 
levels of interest payment and by cleaning up balance sheets.”146 This intervention was only 
applicable to “the import and application of foreign technology and the development of Greek-
based technology.”147 Therefore any intervention in the economy was strictly limited to 
technology companies. This complements the Commission’s Economic Policy of State aid 
through the use of programmes of efficiency.  
 
The BRO intervened in companies under the following conditions:148  
• the beneficiary company has suspended or ceased trading for financial reasons 
• the beneficiary company has stopped making payments. 
• the beneficiary company has been placed in receivership or is under temporary 
administration or any form of liquidation. 
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• the beneficiary company has debt five times the sum of its company capital and visible 
reserves and is manifestly unable to meet its obligation. 
• the beneficiary company is of interest to national defence or of vital importance in the 
exploitation of sources of national wealth. 
 
The organisational structure of the BRO is vague. It is described as being held by the “Greek 
State or by the State and the local government bodies, employees bodies, state-controlled banks 
and public sector undertakings.”149 This is a marked departure from the decision regarding the 
Italian Law No 184 of 22 March 1971, where the Commission stated “the central authority 
confines itself to the acquisition of certain firms with specified terms, duration and purpose.”  
The Commission quickly emphasises the use of a Greek Economic Stabilization and Recovery 
Programme in conjunction with the BRO Programme. The Commission justified the use of State 
aid through the BRO as “20% of the industrial employment of Greece and a considerably larger 
percentage of its industrial output and international trade” would be affected.150  This quantifies 
the “systemic” element of Article 107(3)(b). Finally the Commission states that “the aid must 
not promote the expansion of the production capacity (and must not) merely shift the problem 
without finding a genuine solution to the social and industrial problems facing the 
Community.”151 This reinforces the idea of State aid at a Community level and not a national 
level and it also prevents member states from using State aid as a facade for national subsidies.  
 
The economic conditions improved in Europe in the 1990’s and there was an overall decrease in 
the levels of rescue and recapitalisation aid under Article 107 (3)(b) and (c). The Commission 
expanded the use of horizontal aid programs including aid for environmental protection and 
energy conservation, SMEs, privatization and investment aid in 1992 and rescue and 
recapitalisation aid in 1994. 
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3.4 The R&R Framework 
In 1994 the Commission expanded its horizontal aid programme by launching a Framework for 
Rescue and Recapitalisation (R&R).152 Although both rescue and recapitalisation were 
considered in the same Report, they were two distinct mechanisms, never to be combined. This 
policy was changed in the 2004 Report on Rescue and Recapitalisation. Rescue aid was deemed 
to be temporary in nature: “rescue aid provides a brief respite, generally for not more than six 
months.”153 In contrast, recapitalisation aid is long term and is incorporated with a “feasible, 
coherent and far-reaching plan to restore a firm's long-term viability.”154 Therefore a member 
state should never grant the aid to a failing undertaking. The purpose of rescue and 
recapitalisation aid was to maintain “a competitive market structure when the disappearance of 
firms could lead to a monopoly...and by the special needs and wider economic benefits of SME 
sector.”155 This market driven purpose was greatly expanded to include any and all sectors 
(discussed below at 4.5). It is significant to note that the purpose of the rescue and 
recapitalisation aid is not only to return a firm to viability but also to prevent a monopoly from 
forming in the market. 
 
3.4.1 The proportionality test on the primary sector  
The Commission introduced the proportionality test under R&R Report. The test consisted of 
proportionality of aid, minimal impact on the market and necessity of the State aid.  
Proportionality was applied in two circumstances, firstly, where there is an over capacity in the 
manufacturing sector, “the restructuring plan must make a contribution, proportionate to the 
amount of aid received”156 and secondly, and more significantly, where an over capacity was not 
at issue “the aid will be used only for the purpose of restoring the firm’s viability” and the 
amount…of the aid must be limited to the strict minimum needed to enable restructuring to be 
undertaken and must be related to the benefits anticipated from the Community point of view.”157 
The wording of the proportionality test suggests the Commission only considered applying the 
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test on the manufacturing sectors, SMEs or agricultural sectors (primary sectors). The Report 
also constantly refers to the “production capacity” as a measurement for the State aid investment. 
This has major implications when the proportionality test is applied to the services sector. 
The concept of production capacity is not innate to the services sectors. Programmes of 
efficiency are inherently easier to implement in the manufacturing or agricultural sectors. These 
sectors can be modernised or computerised. The services sector in contrast is not as susceptible 
to programmes of efficiency such as modernisation, training or computerisation. Therefore the 
Commission’s only tool to ensure proportionality is to restructure the beneficiary. However 
restructuring a beneficiary does not guarantee increasing the efficiency of the firm and it does 
not guarantee a return to viability (discussed at 4.5). The Commission ensures the minimal 
impact on the Common Market by requiring the beneficiary to make significant contributions 
towards any restructuring plan “from its own resources or from external commercial 
financing.”158 The R&R Report focuses on the minimal, necessary and proportional impact on 
the Common Market rather then the domestic market. The R&R Report was quickly tested with 
the advent of the Credit Lyonnais Application. 
 
3.5 The Credit Lyonnais Application 
In 1994 the Commission was faced with the rescue and recapitalisation of Credit Lyonnais (CL) 
in the French banking sector. It was then the single largest amount of State aid for an undertaking 
in the history of Community. CL had been experiencing financial difficulties since 1992, after a 
period of expanded growth. This lead the French Government to create a “hive off vehicle” 
Omnium Immobilier de Gestion (OIG) which absorbed property assets of FRF 40 billion (€6 
billion ).  In 1995, a further FRF 190 billion (€28.6 billion) of assets were transferred to two new 
hive off vehicles CDR and SPBI of which, the losses were covered under a state guarantee to 
prevent the insolvency of CL.  CDR absorbed OIG. The net value of the two hive off vehicles 
was about FRF 135 billion (€20 billion). Both CDR and SPBI’s banking arms had a life span of 
five years. CDR was also financed by a private firm EPFR of up to FRF145 billion (€22 billion) 
to be paid off by 2014. The state guarantee of CL resulted in the French Government being liable 
for any losses. The French State Guarantee complicated the rescue and recapitalisation State aid 
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because ultimately the French taxpayer was liable. Therefore CL could not fail for fear of the 
liability.  
 
In 1996 the French Government recapitalised CL with a further FRF 4 billion. In 1996 the 
Commission approved the emergency aid and initiated Article 108 (2) (ex article 93 (2)) 
procedure, investigating restructuring measures obligated by recapitalisation conditions. The 
Commission decided that the aid was “compatible with the common market under Article 92 
(3)(c)…and with the Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in 
difficulty159” despite the fact that over 50% of CL’s business existed outside of France. The 
Commission used Article 107 (3)(c) because the economic problems were limited to a particular 
sector within a single beneficiary despite the wider economic implications. 
 
The Commission used the following restrictions to reduce the adverse trading conditions and 
ensure compliance of State aid: 
(1) a restructuring plan based on realistic assumptions which enables a minimum 
return on the invested capital to be generated within a reasonable time-span and 
the firm's long-term viability to be guaranteed; 
(2) the provision of sufficient quid pro quos to offset the distorting effect of aid on 
competition so that the aid can be regarded as not contrary to the common 
interest; 
(3) aid should be proportional to the objectives in question and the amount of aid 
should be limited to the strict minimum needed for restructuring so that the 
recipient company itself makes a maximum contribution to the recovery plan; 
(4) the full implementation of the restructuring plan and observance of any other 
obligation laid down by the Commission's final decision; 
(5) setting-up of a monitoring system for the previous condition.160 
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The Commission implemented the proportionality test under the 1994 R&R Report. However the 
Report was not designed to be used on the services sector and particularly on a financial 
institution on this scale. The scope of the Report and the amounts of money involved were 
outside anything that the Commission was prepared for.  
The difficulty in providing State aid for a bank is the aid preserves an inefficient entity for the 
overall health of the economy. This is a programme of equity, used to maintain the status quo. 
Restructuring the beneficiary bank goes some way in reducing the equitable issues, however the 
impact on preserving an inefficient bank on the domestic market and Common Market is massive 
and restructuring does not guarantee a return to viability. State aid by its very nature is an 
interference or manipulation of the market. The motivation behind State aid regulation is to 
protect the Common Market from inefficient interference or manipulation. Therefore in this case 
how does the Commission justify using a programme of equity to recapitalise an ailing 
company? The aid was used to preserve an inefficient undertaking because of the economic 
vacuum that would be left in its absence. Public money was being used because the social 
objective benefits (of preventing a wider banking crisis) exceeded the costs of recapitalisation. 
This is contrary to Commission’s Economic Policy. Previous programmes such as the Greek 
BRO Programme were limited to R&D or training initiatives.  
 
3.5.1 Proportionality and Credit Lyonnais 
To limit the economic damage of State aid the Commission stressed that the “aid should be 
proportional to the objectives in question and the amount of aid should be limited to the strict 
minimum needed for restructuring so that the recipient company itself makes a maximum 
contribution to the recovery plan.”161 This complies with the 1994 R&R Report. The 
Commission decided in “examining a measure to assist the restructuring of a firm in difficulty, 
its overall assessment (was) to consider whether the common interest is served by the 
maintenance of the firm in business, given the competition that exists in the industry and the way 
competition will be affected by the aid.”162 This “common interest” is the social objective by 
which the Commission currently justifies the use of State aid under Article 107 (3)(b). The 
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Commission concluded “CL has received State aid equal to at least twice and possibly even 
three times its current own funds, which amounted to FRF 44 billion in 1997.”163  This had the 
result of enabling CL to not only avoid liquidation but to maintain a strong presence in the 
market.   
The Commission ensured proportionality via a “quid pro quo” approach. This reduced the State 
aid’s competitive effects. The Commission minimised distortions to the Common Market by 
reducing the market share of CL by selling off assets and therefore “serving to offset as far as 
possible the distortion of competition caused by the aid.”164 The “quid pro quo” has the dual 
effect of raising funds for the beneficiary, through the selling of assets which were then in turn 
are used to finance the restructuring effort.  The use of quid pro quo is significant. The 
Commission in this decision appears to have confused proportionality with quid pro quo. The 
proportionality test ensures aid is minimal, proportional and necessary. Quid pro quo is a concept 
outside the test of proportionality. It perpetuates a sense of equivalency, where proportionality 
imbues a sense of equilibrium. Subiotto highlights that under quid pro quo the “beneficiaries 
(might) have been required to take additional compensatory steps.”165 Similarly how would the 
Commission use quid pro quo against an unviable undertaking? (see 4.1). The Commission 
instructed CL to reduce its commercial presence outside France by selling assets worth FRF 556 
billion and internally selling assets of FRF 64 billion. This reflected the high levels of disruption 
felt by CL’s competitors.  
 
It is important to reiterate that CL’s State aid was subject to Article 107 (3)(c). The CL decision 
is a significant departure from precedent. The Commission was unprepared for a challenge from 
the services sector especially on such a massive scale. The Commission responded by expanding 
the scope of the 1994 R&R Framework to include the services sector. However the aid was not 
applied through any programmes of efficiency. The Commission implemented a proportionality 
test (via restructuring) to achieve a balance against the French State aid. The Commission was 
attempting to ensure the return to viability of Credit Lyonnais.  The Commission embraced an 
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equitable programme to correct a market failure and to achieve financial stability It was an 
inappropriate limitation of State aid when combined with the social objective of financial 
stability. The social objective will always negate the equity/efficiency distinction.  
CL is an excellent example of an ailing firm in need of several State aid injections within a 
limited time frame. CL had experienced difficulty for several years and the Commission was 
familiar with its financial viability. However in a situation where an undertaking needs several 
State aid injections within the six month timeframe, the Commission would have to grant the aid 
without examining the restructuring/viability plan. The Commission will not know if the firm is 
viable until the plan is submitted. The Commission is financially blind (see 4.8). 
There are mechanisms for repatriating State aid however in the case of CL, the French 
Government would never allow the State aid to be repatriated. This is the underlines the 
realpolitik surrounding State aid.  
Post Credit Lyonnais, the Commission continues to justify the use of State aid through the public 
interest objective. “So even if the member state does not choose the most efficient undertaking, 
the decision cannot be overturned where reasonable objective justification is given for the 
choice.” 166 However the use of a public interest objective is a dangerously vague concept. It is 
difficult to contemplate a limit on any public interest objective where a financial institution (or 
any services sector undertaking) is in danger of collapse. This has huge implications for every 
member state.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The use of  Article 107 (3)(b) and (3)(c) has incrementally grown from a strict position allowing 
aid under the criteria in the 1971 Belgium Decision case167 through the 1975 Energy Crisis to the 
1987 Greek BRO Programme. The Commission kept the aid within the criteria of temporary, for 
restructuring purposes, and confined within programmes of efficiency. The Credit Lyonnais case 
marked a major departure from these policies. The services sector is not as susceptible to the 
normal modes of State aid. The Commission utilised the proportionality test to qualify the needs 
of the beneficiary against the needs of the common and domestic markets with the goal of 
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maintaining the social objective of financial stability. This justified the abandoning of the 
Commission’s Economic and Legal Policy. However the CL case was limited to the remit of 
Article 107 (3)(c) at an undertaking or/and sectoral level. To apply the proportionality test to the 
services sector under Article 107 (3)(b) is a dangerous combination. A member state 
experiencing an economic crisis could in theory justify large amounts of State aid to ailing or 
even failing firms. This could negate the effects of the proportionality test.  
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Chapter Four Post Credit Lyonnais 
The post Credit Lyonnais era was a period of economic stability in Europe. The Commission 
continued to apply the proportionality test to State aid applications.  The overall levels of State 
aid fell (see section 2.2). However with a contraction in the European Economy and the advent 
of the financial crisis in September 2008, systemic economic problems emerged and the 
proportionality test under Article 107(3)(b) was applied to bring economic balance.  
The Commission published five significant reports as part of a ‘Crisis Framework’ in State aid in 
response to the economic difficulties applicable to Article 107 (3)(b) TFEU and Article 107 
(3)(c) TFEU.  The Crisis Framework consists of: 
1. “Community Guidelines on State aid for Rescuing and Restructuring firms in difficulty”, 
October 2004 (the R&R Report) (discussed under Article 107(c)).168  
2. “The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions 
in the context of the current global financial crisis”, October 2008 (the Banking 
Communication).169  
3. “The recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial crisis” in 
December 2008 (the Recap Report).170  
4. “Commission communication on the return to viability and the assessment of 
restructuring measure in the financial sector in the current crisis under the State aid 
rules”, (2009) (the Viability Report).171  
5. “The Treatment of Impaired Assets in the Community Banking Sector”, 2009 (IAC). 172 
  
R&R Report is pre-financial crisis and is directly related to Article 107 (3)(c) and indirectly to 
Article 107 (3)(b). The next two reports were published in reaction to the financial crisis and 
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apply to Article 107 (3)(b).  The Viability Report is applied at a post recapitalisation stage, to 
ensure stability in the Common  Market and will therefore be examined in the chapter five. The 
IAC Report is instrumental in advising the member states regarding asset management schemes 
such as NAMA (also see 4.5). The Commission assessed NAMA under Article 107 (3)(b) TFEU. 
This is subject to the Commission’s Banking Communication. The Banking Communication is 
of direct relevance so is examined below in detail. 
  
4.1 The Banking Communication 
Bolton states the Banking Communication was published in response to the repercussions to the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.173 The collapse of Lehman Brothers heralded 
the disruption of the inter-bank lending market. Banks struggled to access credit and laboured to 
apply for quick State aid under the old rescue and restructuring guidelines. 174 The timeframe for 
granting aid and the amounts of aid given were inadequate.175  The Commission published the 
Banking Communication in October 2008 to provide a specific, uniform approach to financial 
sector State aid. The Banking Communication provides a framework for recapitalisation 
schemes, banking guarantee schemes and ad hoc measures. 
The Banking Communication distinguishes between the difficulties faced not only by ailing 
banks, but also for banks that are fundamentally sound but are facing crises stemming from the 
collapse of the inter-bank lending market. The Banking Communication quickly differentiates 
between State aid applications for individual undertakings under Article 107 (3)(c) and “aid 
undertaken to address this systemic crisis”176 in a group of undertakings or an ailing sector under 
Article 107 (3)(b). Further to this, the Commission will continue to interpret Article 107 (3)(b) 
restrictively in line with the Freistaat Sachsen case.177 
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This Report reiterates the proportionality test codified in the R&R Report.178 This test consists 
of:  
1. Appropriateness; the aid is well targeted to its objective, to remedy a serious 
disturbance in the entire economy. 
2. Necessity: the aid measure must in its amount and form be necessary to achieve 
the objective. The aid must be the minimum amount necessary to reach the 
objective.  
3. Proportionality: the distortions of competition must be properly balanced against 
the positive effects of the measure. 
The proportionality test was applied to all economic exemption State aid applications. The 
difficulty in applying the test under 107 (3)(b), is that in theory no application would fail it 
because of the exceptional nature of Article 107(3)(b). By applying the proportionality test under 
Nicolaides’ criteria,179 it emphasises the inapplicability of Article 107 (3)(b):   
1.  Appropriateness: rescue aid is appropriate by its very nature. It is targeted to 
remedy a serious systemic problem. 
2.  Necessity: “in the absence of state aid, undertakings could not do on their own 
what the aid scheme seeks to induce them to do.”  The purpose of the 107 (3)(b) 
aid is rescue. A firm under 107 (3)(b) could not use its own resources because of 
the extent of its financial problems.   
3.  Proportionality: This is more difficult to quantify.  Nicolaides suggests measuring 
the use of State aid through an aid ceiling.180  Aid ceiling are applied in other 
forms of aid such as regional aid. However this is not applicable, to 107 (3)(b) 
because it does not have a codified aid ceiling. The concept of an aid ceiling for 
rescue aid could undermine the rescue. Maes states that State aid ceiling are 
insufficient, “the need to grant aid may differ across MS. But the aid needs to be 
proportional and limited to the minimum necessary.” 181 Several member states 
have introduced domestic caps to State aid. Spain has capped State aid in direct 
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proportion to the beneficiary’s market share,182 whilst Austria has created a State 
aid ceiling.183 Both mechanisms are consistent with State aid requirements. 
However both mechanisms limit the State aid contributions by the member states 
to potential beneficiaries. 
4.  Nicolaides also suggests cumulation of aid; “no aid from two or more sources 
may be received.”184 Again this is not relevant to Article 107 (3)(b), because the 
aid comes from one government source as seen with NAMA. This stresses how 
the proportionality test was not designed and is not suitable to be applied under 
Article 107 (3)(b).   
The proportionality test further functions to protect the member state. State aid given via rescue 
and recapitalisation aid must be repaid by the beneficiary.185 Where amounts of State aid are 
given from small member states such as Ireland, the repayment of the State aid in the long term 
ensures the member state will not go into debt. However, where the State aid is given to a ailing 
firm there is no assurance that the State aid will be repaid. This results in the transfer of the 
financial difficulties from the beneficiary to the member state. Kelly estimates that the 
Government has committed up to €70 billion into NAMA and recapitalisation of the banks, of 
which up to 50% could be lost.186 This highlights the disproportionate effect of State aid on an 
ailing company. This is a major State aid issue, any attempt to wind down these beneficiaries 
will therefore disrupt the proportionality of that aid. 
The Credit Lyonnais case suggests the Commission can gain proportionality by reducing the  
international and domestic branches of an undertaking. This is however an ineffective method of 
ensuring proportionality, to a small group of banks with limited foreign assets, based mostly  
within one member state. How does the Commission therefore ensure State aid proportionality? 
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4.1.1 Solvency Ratio and proportionality 
The Commission has successfully applied a solvency ratio to airline companies, ensuring the 
beneficiary is not overcapitalised as a result of the aid. The Commission found that State aid did 
not lead to overcapitalisation in the following cases with following debt/equity ratios 1.25 for 
Sabena in 1991, 0.75 for Aer lingus in 1995 and again in 1996 at 0.41 and 0.78 for Olympic 
Airways in 1994.187 Schiitterle states that the Commission could use the solvency ratio to ensure 
proportionality. 188 This was applied in GAN case189 where the Commission noted “following the 
state aid operation, the level of capitalisation of the group is barely above the regulatory limit 
and is therefore not liable to strengthen GAN beyond that which is strictly necessary for its 
restructuring.”190 The Commission applied this test in Credit Lyonnais stating “a capital 
injection of FRF 1 billion, or any measure whose effect is equivalent, allows a bank to increase 
the weighted assets in its balance sheet above what is required by the compulsory solvency ratio 
of 4 % to 8 %, and thus to expand its activities.”191 The Commission measured proportionally of 
State aid through an examination of the balance sheet of the beneficiary vis-à-vis the state aid 
injection. Credit Lyonnais (CL) received an injection of three times its balance sheet.192 The 
Commission applied the solvency ratio test and CL was deemed over recapitalised. CL’s assets 
were reduced as a result (see 3.5). Under the application of the solvency ratio, in theory all the 
NAMA beneficiaries would be deemed proportional vis-à-vis the State aid injection if they 
return to the nominal liquidity ratio (see Anglo in Section 4.1.1). However this alone could not 
act as the standard for State aid. A viability test would be needed to ensure further 
recapitalisation injections would not be needed. 
 
4.2 The Systemic nature of Article 107 (3)(b) 
Article 107(3)(b) is reserved for State aid to remedy a ‘systemic crisis’. This is the defining 
quality of Article 107 (3)(b). It is however a nebulous concept. The 1975 Energy Crisis was 
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deemed an economic crisis at a systemic level. Similarly the Greek financial crisis in 1987 the 
Commission equated a systemic problem as “20% of the industrial employment of Greece.”193 
The uncertainty that surrounds the systemic quality exists within Irish financial sector. 
Bank Total assets 2008 EUR bn % of total balance sheet % GDP approx 
Bank of Ireland 194.1 26.5 100% 
Allied Irish Bank 179.5 24.5 90% 
Anglo Irish Bank 88.5 12.1 50% 
EBS 21.4 2.9 12.50% 
INBS 14.4 2 7% 
        Fig 1.0194 
From Fig 1.0, BOI, AIB and Anglo are obviously of systemic importance to the Irish Economy. 
However EBS and INBS have significantly smaller balance sheet  as a % GDP. The Commission 
applied the broad social objectivity standard to all State aid applications and although a small 
credit institution would not have systemic presence within the Irish Economy, its failure would 
“undermine confidence in the Irish financial sector as a whole, thus entailing a serious risk of a 
systemic crisis.”195 This stresses the difficulty in applying the broad social objective standard; 
every financial institute is eligible not because they are of systemic importance in the economy 
but because their failure would expose the remaining financial sector. This is the lowest possible 
standard for a State aid test. It also results in an increase in the amounts of State aid needed, 
further marginalising the proportionality test. 
 
4.3 The Irish Guarantee Scheme 
The Irish Government attempted to stabilise the Irish financial sector through the use of a 
Banking guarantee scheme on 30th September 2008 under the Credit Institutions Financial 
Support Act 2008 (CIFS).  The scope of the Guarantee covered “all deposits, covered bonds, 
senior debt and dated subordinated debt with the following banks: Allied Irish Bank, Bank of 
Ireland, Anglo Irish Bank, Irish Life and Permanent, Irish Nationwide Building Society and the 
Educational  Building Society”196 until 28th September 2010. The value of the Guarantee is 
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estimated at €65billion.197 The scope of the debts covered is massive. It includes every type of 
deposit and debt held by a bank. Initially the Guarantee was only available to domestic banks but 
this was extended by request from the Commission to any subsidy of a bank operating in Ireland 
of “systemic significance…with a significant main street retail presence.”198  This is now the 
current test for banking guarantees ensuring minimal discrimination of non-domestic European 
banks.  The Guarantee contains a “claw back clause” allowing any costs to be recouped by the 
State. This functions to protect the taxpayer from liability. This was codified in the Forms 
Guarantee Report as “such risk-carrying by the State should normally be remunerated by an 
appropriate premium.”199 The Guarantee contains a transparency and enforcement clause that 
allows the Minister of Finance to “increase the charge, impose additional conditions or revoke 
the guarantee”200 to ensure maximum protection for the taxpayer. The protection of the taxpayer 
is of up most importance to the Commission and this protection was codified in the Banking 
Communication.201  The Commission’s Forms of Guarantee Report contains one criterion on the 
eligibility of a beneficiary, namely “the borrower is not in financial difficulty.”202 This must be 
combined with a high level of transparency to ensure that the beneficiaries are not in financial 
difficulty. The Commission relies on financial reports from the Central Bank, Irish Financial 
Regulator and the Irish Government to assess the financial situation of an undertaking. It is in the 
banks interest to receive the State aid and it is in the Governments interests to ensure the viability 
of the financial sector. Therefore there are strong motivations to misrepresent a potential 
beneficiary’s financial status. 
In addition the Forms of Guarantee Report obligates any guarantee beneficiary to be 
contractually linked to specific conditions which may go as far as the compulsory declaration of 
bankruptcy for an undertaking.203 This gives the member states an exit strategy in the event a 
guarantee becomes unfeasible.  It has become clear that three of the six beneficiaries were in 
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financial difficulty at the creation of the Banking Guarantee, namely Anglo Irish Bank204, Irish 
Nationwide205 and Educational Building Society.206 This calls into question the transparency and 
disclosure measures of these undertakings and the ability of Government, Central Bank and 
Financial Regulators to audit and regulate the financial sector. It is also in violation of the only 
criterion of the Commission’s Forms of Guarantee Report namely “the borrower is not in 
financial difficulty.” The Irish Government under the terms of Guarantee can expel these 
beneficiaries. It is unlikely to do so as the Guarantee is to expire as of September 2010 and to 
expel these beneficiaries would destabilise the banking sector and therefore undermine the social 
objective of the Irish Guarantee. The Commission could launch an investigation under Article 
108 and impose fines. It is unlikely to do this as the fines would ultimately be paid by the 
taxpayer, the very group the Commission is trying to protect from exposure. 
 
In assessing the Irish Banking Guarantee the Commission applied the MEIP under Article 107 
(1). It found that the Guarantee went beyond the MEIP where:  
1. The very large scope of the guarantee was beyond anything a private operator 
would engage.  
2. Guarantees don’t exist in the normal market. 
3. No private investor could have granted such a significant guarantee on such a 
large scale. 
4. The guarantee imposed allows the banks to obtain liquidity at an advantageous 
condition 
5. The guarantee is successful because it is backed by a sovereign government. 207 
The factors applied by the Commission are so general they will ensure every guarantee applied 
under the MEIP will fail.  The Commission found the guarantee provided a selective advantage 
to the beneficiaries and therefore created a distortion on the competition and trade between the 
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member states. This is consistent with the Banking Communication. Therefore the Commission 
found the Guarantee constitutes State aid within the meaning of 107 (1) TFEU. 
 
The Commission assessed the scheme under Article 107 (3)(b). This complies with the Banking 
Communication, it allows the use of Article 107 (3)(b) “in light of the level of seriousness that 
the current crisis in the financial markets has reached and of its possible impact on the overall 
economy of Member States.”208  The Commission applied the proportionality test outlined in the 
Banking Communication to the Irish Guarantee Scheme and found that as regards: 
1. Appropriateness: the Guarantee will stabilise the banks by reviving depositors trust in the 
banking system and thereby avoiding bank runs. 
2. (a) Minimum scope necessary: the guarantee includes everything, this has the effect of 
reassuring depositors and therefore the scope is deemed appropriate. 
 (b) Minimum time necessary: the Commission distinguishes between individual 
undertakings with a minimum of six months necessary and a group of undertaking with a 
minimum of two years necessary to regain stability. The scope of two years is also linked 
to the “resumption of inter-bank lending” in the global market. This is a nebulous 
concept with no guarantee of the resumption of inter-bank lending at any level. 
3. Minimising distortions to the competition. The Commission highlights the use of the fee 
element of the Guarantee, which will “compensate the State for the additional funding 
costs it bears as a consequence of the guarantee” and in particular the related risk 
profiling. This shields the taxpayer from loss. The contribution by the banks minimises 
the distortion caused by the Guarantee. 
 
Finally the Commission reacted favourably with the oversight function of the Regulatory 
Authority (RA). The RA will “monitor and review the expansion of the activities of covered 
institution benefiting from the guarantee.”209 This ensures that the beneficiaries will not gain a 
competitive advantage through the Guarantee. This exists independently to the Commission’s 
monitoring and regulatory function. 
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Eight days after the Guarantee was launched, the RA fined Irish Nationwide Building Society 
after Mr Michael Fingleton Jnr used the Guarantee as a marketing ploy to encourage investment 
with the Building Society. The RA fined the Irish Nationwide Building Society €50,000 and the 
matter was deemed closed.210 Despite the low amount of the fine, this is a good example of a 
domestic body enforcing a State aid issue and how a company could violate the Guarantee 
Agreement and act aggressively upon receiving State aid. The Commission strongly criticised 
Irish Nationwide’s action but did not investigate or fine the company. This is probably because 
the RA had already investigated and fined the Building Society.  
 
Historically banking guarantees have always existed as an exception to the rules on State aid as 
evidenced in Section 3.1.2 by the Netherlands Nationale Investeringsbank (NIB). The application 
of the proportionality test to the Irish Banking Guarantee highlights a convergence of the criteria 
for the banking guarantee with other forms of State aid assessment. The utilisation of the MEIP 
to a banking guarantee ensures that the guarantee will always be deemed as State aid.  
 
4.4 The European Guarantee Scheme 
Directive 2009/14/EC guarantees up to €50,000 per deposit.211 This is expected to be increased 
to €100,000 on 31st December 2010.212 The purpose of which is to “maintain depositors 
confidence and attain greater stability on the financial market.”213 
By implementing a pan European Guarantee Scheme covering up to €100,000 it will reduce the 
need of the member states to introduce domestic guarantee schemes. As evidenced with the 
Credit Lyonnais case and evidenced below, the interaction between a guarantee scheme and 
further State aid mechanism results in:   
1. members states being obligated to give aid. 
2. the Commission granting state aid because the member state is liable. 
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The proposed European guarantee scheme should replace the need for a domestic guarantee 
scheme. Therefore the new European guarantee will ensure that State aid applications will be 
considered in isolation of any domestic recapitalisation schemes, which will hugely simplify 
State aid regulation. Any domestic recapitalisation schemes can therefore be considered without 
the obligation that a banking guarantee creates. 
 
4.5 NAMA and Anglo 
There were several State aid mechanisms implemented to further stabilise individual banks. In 
examining NAMA, it is necessary to examine these and their incremental effects. The 
Commission is not examining NAMA in its entirety but it is examining the individual bank 
transfers on a case by case basis as per the Irish Governments request.214 In examining NAMA, 
this researcher will take the example of Anglo Irish Bank and its State aid mechanisms. Anglo 
Irish Bank is suitable because it is one of the most controversial of all the financial institutions 
involved in NAMA and because Anglo’s total assets as % GDP is the average of the financial 
institutions in Ireland. (See fig 1.0) 
 
4.6 The first recapitalisation application of Anglo Irish Bank 
On the 21st December 2008, three months after the Banking Guarantee was launched, the Irish 
Government announced it would recapitalise Anglo by €1.5billion. Anglo had a balance sheet of 
over €100 billion (50% of Irish GDP).215 The Bank lent 70% of its total assets (just less then 
€100 billion) of which 57% was in Ireland, 29% in the UK and 13% in the US.216 The Irish 
Government proposed to inject the €1.5 billion to “avoid further deterioration in the financial 
situation of the Bank which would represent a threat to the stability of both the financial system 
in the State and the wider economy.”217 A restructuring plan had to be submitted within six 
months as per the Banking Communication. The six month period is problematic as an ailing 
firm might require further aid within that time frame. The Commission is financially blind for six 
months and therefore this process could be subject to abuse. This happened with Anglo’s 
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recapitalisation. The Commission granted two State aid applications before a restructuring plan 
was received. The restructuring plan was deemed insufficient and an investigation has 
commenced (see below).  
The Commission stated “the R&R guidelines are of general application, while foreseeing certain 
specific criteria for the financial sector.”218 The R&R Guidelines were created for Article 107 
(3)(c). This is further evidence of the convergence in assessing undertakings via Article 107 
(3)(b) and Article 107 (3)(c).  The Irish Government received a 75% voting right in the company 
for the capital injection with a five year buy back clause from Anglo. The Commission did not 
view the transfer of ownership as an issue and the five year buy back clause will act as an 
incentive for Anglo to repurchase the shares. 
The Commission granted the recapitalisation under Article 107 (3)(b) because the combination 
of the Banking Guarantee and new recapitalisation (particularly the restructuring aspect) will 
“secure the proportionality of the aid and (will serve) to limit possible distortions of 
competition”219  Regarding Anglo’s financial position the Commission  stated it “does not share 
the view of the Irish authorities that the bank remains fundamentally sound.”220 Ultimately the 
Commission granted the aid because it was consistent with the Recap Report.  The Commission 
granted State aid to a firm that is not viable. This is contrary to the current Crisis Framework. 
The Commission appears to be influenced by the “small” amount of aid requested. This 
highlights the issue of the uniform application of State aid to member states.  Ireland’s tax 
income for 2008 was approximately 49 billion.221 In contrast, German revenue for the same 
period was €1050.7 billion.222 One billion euro is a substantial amount for any small member 
state. An unviable firm should not receive aid just because the application is inline with the 
overall Crisis Framework. Furthermore to attain proportionality from a State aid injection, the 
firm must return to viability. Proportionality cannot be achieved from a liquated firm. In contrast 
to this State aid cannot be used to artificially maintain an ailing firm. Therefore State aid should 
be granted only to viable firms. 
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As in the Credit Lyonnais case, the use of a bank guarantee has lead to a situation that the State 
aid had to be given. If Anglo had gone into liquidation in December 2008, the tax payer would 
have been liable.  The €1 billion recapitalisation was never given to Anglo. The economic 
situation deteriorated and State aid on a larger scale was deemed necessary as is outlined below. 
 
4.7 The Nationalisation of Anglo Irish Bank 
On the 4th February 2009, the Government notified the Commission of the nationalisation of 
Anglo “for as long as this required to safeguard its financial stability.”223 The nationalisation 
was necessary because of the “corporate governance developments at the Bank had caused 
serious reputational damage to it.”224 The Commission perceives the nationalisation of Anglo as 
a “mere change in ownership”225and this does not constitute State aid under Article 107 (1) of 
the TFEU. The Commission viewed the Banking Guarantee in combination with the 
nationalisation of Anglo as not creating an extra burden on the State. However this presumption 
is flawed. The Guarantee is temporary in nature and a burden would be created if any future 
liabilities arose. Therefore nationalisation is not a mere change in ownership it is a promise to 
cover any future liabilities. This promise has huge implications particularly where an 
undertaking is in difficulty and it is applying for aid under Article 107 (3) (b) or (c). Anglo had 
already been granted aid for recapitalisation under Article 107 (3)(b) and given the contraction in 
the economy and the firms financially difficulty there was a high probability that future State aid 
would be needed. The Commission, in granting the nationalisation effectively ensured the Irish 
State would be liable for all future debts. This however, would be subject to further Commission 
approval.  
This demonstrates that the Commission considers Anglo (and other beneficiaries) as quasi-
nationalised under the Banking Guarantee.  The Guarantee would and must cover any future 
liabilities. Therefore any banking applications of State aid would be granted for the duration of 
the Banking Guarantee. This unlimited access to State aid could be problematic where a credit 
institution cannot raise capital on the markets. The Government is therefore the only source of 
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capital.  It is possible that the cost of State aid will be greater then the cost of not granting State 
aid. This issue is more likely to arise under Article 107 (3)(b) where there is a systemic economic 
problem, than any other Article 107 exemptions. State aid applications under 107(3)(b) by their 
nature are more costly. This has a greater impact on smaller member states such as Ireland.  
The Commission’s decision may have been different if the Banking Guarantee did not exist, in 
this situation the transfer of Anglo’s liabilities on to the State would have probably been deemed 
State aid under Article 107 (1) and therefore by subject to Article 107 (3)(b). 
 
4.8 The Second Recapitalisation Application of Anglo Irish Bank   
On the 29th May 2009, the Irish Government applied for a €4 billion capital injection of State aid 
to Anglo Irish Bank. This recapitalisation is significant because it is four times that of the 
January Recapitalisation Application which the Commission deemed not a significant size.226 
Furthermore the Commission stated that Anglo is not viable.227 The €4 billion recapitalisation 
was deemed necessary because of a combination of the financial crisis, the Banking Guarantee 
and pre-nationalisation reputational damage of Anglo. The purpose of the measure is “to 
preserve the stability of Anglo, to safeguard the Irish financial system and to remedy a serious 
disturbance in the Irish economy caused.”228 Critically the liquidity ratio had fallen below the 
minimum regulatory standards of the Financial Regulator. The Financial Regulator granted a 
temporary derogation in respect of this liquidity shortfall. However under paragraph 28 and 
30,229 Anglo “will have to draw up a restructuring plan within six months...where (the) covered 
institutions’ solvency ratio falls below the minimum regulatory standard.” The second 
recapitalisation application was still within the six month restructuring plan limit of the first 
recapitalisation application. Stan Maes, head of the Chief Economist Team, European 
Commission stated in the questionnaire that the “bank restructuring (monitoring)”230 is one of 
the biggest issues concerning State aid. If the restructuring/viability plan is deemed insufficient, 
the Commission could repatriate the State aid.231 The Commission is unlikely repatriate the State 
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aid, because the realpolitik  of the situation could and would not allow it. Withdrawing the State 
aid from Anglo would result in its collapse. The recapitalisation application states the initial 
deleveraging (reduction of financial instruments) will offset against NAMA proposal “if 
possible.”232 This is a serious State aid issue. A member state cannot rely on one State aid 
mechanism to offset another, particularly where NAMA was still (at the time) under the 
Commission’s consideration.  Anglo also proposed to use €1 billion of the €4 billion to purchase 
old subordinated loans and thus reduce Anglo’s overall debt via a “Liability Management 
Exercise”.   
 
In assessing the aid under Art 107 (1), the Commission found Anglo was open to “intense 
international competition”233 and the aid was imputable to the Irish State and therefore “state 
resources are involved.”234 The imputability test was first implied in the France v Commission 
where the ECJ held that the “advantages to be capable of being categorised as aid within the 
meaning of Article 87 (1)EC, they must first be granted directly or indirectly through State 
resources...and, second, be imputable to the State.”235 The use of this new test represents a high 
standard in State aid assessment. The Commission applied the MEIP to the application. The 
Commission distinguished between firms in difficulty and normal firms. The MEIP appears to be 
inapplicable where the purpose is to “avoid a further deterioration in Anglo’s financial 
position.”236 This is a major progression in the development of the MEIP.  Every firm in 
difficulty would fail the MEIP. State aid under rescue and recapitalisation by its very nature 
exists outside the MEIP. The Commission applied the test of selectivity where the MEIP was 
inapplicable. The Commission decided “the advantage is selective since it only benefits the 
Bank.”237The Commission examined the application under 107 (3)(b) and applied the 
proportionality test laid out in Banking Communication. 
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The Commission found the aid was appropriate where:  
1. There was a severe deterioration of the capital of Anglo as huge impairment provisions 
are required to cover the losses on its loan books. The Commission considers that the 
Bank is distressed and in serious difficulties failing to meet requirements by the Financial 
Regulator.238 
2. Anglo is of systemic importance to the Irish economy and the “intention of the Irish 
Authorities is that, following the capital injection, there will be a transfer of land and 
...loans and connected exposures to NAMA”239 
3. The Commission views the lack of remuneration from the capital injection as “indicative 
of the high level of distress of Anglo Irish”240 
 
The Commission did not view the Liability Management Exercise as a State aid issue as it will 
be subject to the market value. The second factor above indicates that the recapitalisation was a 
bridging mechanism to NAMA. This goes against the Commission’s primary “first time, last 
time” rule as set out in the R&R Report.241 State aid has never been used to fill a gap until further 
State aid mechanisms can be implemented. State aid mechanisms have always been self 
contained, minimal and necessary. This is stated under the current Crisis Framework and ensured 
through the use the proportionality test, the MEIP and the latest test under the IAC Report 
(discussed below).  Historically there have been times where multiple State aid applications were 
granted to the beneficiary as seen in Credit Lyonnais but the applications were always considered 
independently and in their entirety.  The Commission granted four billion euro to Anglo, a firm it 
considers not viable, without reviewing a restructuring plan (this had not been submitted yet) to 
ensure its survival until the next State aid mechanism (which had not been granted) could be 
implemented. This is a reckless use of State aid by the Commission.  
The third factor goes against the “quid pro qua” perception that the Commission has set as 
standard. It appears that the Commission views the lack of quid pro qua as indicative of distress 
but not a reason to withhold State aid. Overall there is a strong indication by the Commission 
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that restructuring Anglo will remedy many of the issues discussed above. The Commission notes 
that Anglo is subject to the terms of the CIFS. It is unclear if the Commission views this 
positively because Anglo is contractually obligated under the terms of the CIFS or negatively 
because the Irish State is liable and therefore obligated to give the aid. The Commission 
ultimately granted the State aid under Article 107 (3)(b) 
 
4.9 The National Assets Management Agency 
NAMA is an Assets Removal Scheme (ARS). ARSs are traditionally used when there is a higher 
“probability that the pace of deterioration of assets value and credit quality, and associated 
bank assets impairment and capital erosion, could accentuate in the foreseeable future.”242 
ARS’s also allow a “clean break” for the banks allowing them to recover faster then if an Assets 
Insurance Scheme (AIS) is used. An AIS is used “where the assets remain on the banks’ balance 
sheet”243 but the assets are insured by the State. 
The purpose of NAMA is to “restore stability to the Irish banking system” 244 by “acquiring 
such eligible bank assets from participating institutions.”245 The table below shows the total 
assets of the financial institutions based in Ireland. 
fig 2.0246 
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Of the institutions listed above only Bank of Ireland (BOI), Allied Irish Bank (AIB), Anglo Irish 
Bank (Anglo), Educational Building Society (EBS) and Irish National Building Society (INBS) 
have opted to participate in NAMA. 
 
4.10 The NAMA Process 
NAMA will purchase €82.5 billion worth of assets, 247  €10 billion of which is rolled up interest.  
The State will therefore purchase the €72.5 billion of assets with at “hair cut” price of €54 
billion. NAMA will receive €12 billion in interest payments from good developers which owe 
€62 billion of the €72.5 billion. The State will have to pay €16 billion in Irish bond interest 
payments. NAMA will recover €4 billion per annum from selling properties and other assets. 
The interest from the good loans will cover the shortfall from the bad loans. This shortfall is 
predicted to reduce as the assets are sold off and as the loans mature in the eleven year life cycle 
of NAMA. NAMA is predicted to make €5 billion in profit.248   
The transferring process from credit institutions to NAMA is expected to be 7 months in duration 
from May 2010 to November 2010, as shown in Figure 2.  
Figure 2249 
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NAMA’s “fundamental purpose (is to) acquir(e) assets in order to address a serious threat to 
the economy and to the systemic stability of credit institutions in the State.”250 
NAMA will evaluate the property through four mechanisms by calculating: 
1. The current market value of the property or “the estimated amount that would be paid by 
a willing buyer to a willing seller in an arm’s length transaction.”251 
2. The long term economic value of the property. 
3. The current market value of the transferred loan asset itself or “the estimated amount that 
would be paid by a willing buyer to a willing seller in an arm’s length transaction”252 
4. The long term economic value of the loan asset, “the value determined by NAMA.” 
The majority of the evaluation will be determined ahead of the transfer and will be valued by an 
independent professional real estate valuer in accordance with the provisions of the Appraisal 
and Valuation Manual of the UK Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors.  “The asset valuer 
should be a member of a recognised professional body.”253 Independent evaluation is in line 
with IAC “when assessing the valuation methods put forward by the Member State for asset-
relief measures...the Commission will consult panels of valuation experts.”254 Independent 
evaluation of assets is one of the oldest requirements of the Commission. It predates the MEIP 
but it is still useful as it serves to complement the Principle by ensuring market value. 
  
4.10.1 Risk sharing 
Some of the assets cannot be valued ahead of the transfer and if their original price purchase 
price is above NAMA selling price, the financial institution will repay NAMA the difference.  
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There are two further risk sharing mechanisms:  
1. NAMA will pay 5% of the transfer price in the form of a subordinated debt 
security. If losses occur and the repayment of the subordinated security is 
compromised, up to 5% loss will be borne by the participating credit institution. 
2. The Irish Government “intend(s) to introduce a levy on the participating financial 
institutions if, on the winding up of NAMA, there were to be a deficit”255  This 
was not considered by the Commission as it is an intention.  
The Government will submit or amend a restructuring plan for all the undertakings involved and 
will report to the Commission every six months on the “functioning of the assets relief measure 
and on the development of the participating institutions’ restructuring plans.”256 The 
Commission examined NAMA under Article 107 (1) TFEU.  The Commission applied the 
MEIP. The Commission found the purchase of assets with up to 95% State guaranteed bonds are 
clearly financed through State resources. The Commission then applied the selectivity test and 
found an economic advantage to exist where the Scheme strengthens the beneficiaries’ position 
against their competitors in Ireland and in the EU.  Finally the Commission applied the IAC 
Report and found State aid to exist where “impaired assets are purchased at a value above the 
market price”257  This is a new standard applied by the Commission.  The Commission also 
noted that NAMA’s exemption from stamp duty is a direct form of State aid. Taxation as a form 
of State aid is a sensitive subject. Taxation does fall within the sovereignty of a member state and 
non discriminatory taxation does not generally constitute State aid.258 However in the seminal 
case of Italy v Commission 1974,259 the ECJ held that any measures “intended to partially or 
wholly to exempt firms in a particular sector from the charges arising from the normal 
application of the general system without there being any justification for this exemption on the 
basis of the nature….constituted State aid”260 Despite NAMA’s unique function it does not 
justify the exemption from stamp duty because it was deemed a selective advantage of State aid. 
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4.10.2 Transparency 
The IAC requires State aid to “be subject to full ex-ante transparency and the disclosure of 
impairments by eligible banks on the assets”261 covered by NAMA. The Commission also views 
positively the duty of the NAMA Officers “to act in utmost good faith”262and the notification in 
the form of a letter to each individual from the Financial Regulator identifying the valuation 
process and any losses incurred by the participating institutions. The “ex ante” transparency is 
the highest level of transparency ever required by the Commission. The contractual inclusion of 
the fiduciary duty of the NAMA Officers and the notification proceeds are unique and represent 
a major progression in the area of transparency. These measures result in ensuring the NAMA 
Officers are liable for any malfeasance. This could act as an exit strategy for Ireland in the event 
of transparency issues. 
 
4.10.3 Burden Sharing 
The IAC states as a general principle that “banks ought to bear the losses associated with 
impaired assets to the maximum extent”263 and therefore “the assets should be transferred at a 
price that…stays below the real economic value.”264 The Commission views the burden sharing 
scheme as adequate because transfer price is below the real economic value265 of the bank asset. 
 
4.10.4 Eligibility of Assets 
The Commission recognises the Irish Economy has been affected by the burst of a property 
bubble and as a consequence property loans are “at the source of the principle uncertainty”266 
76% of the non-performing aggregate loans of the participating credit institution are in the form 
of loans backed by land and property development.267 This estimate by HSBC highlights the 
large exposure of the financial institutions to the burst property bubble. The Commission found 
on this basis that the scope of assets within NAMA comply with the HSBC Report and are 
therefore eligible for transfer. The IAC expressly states the bursting of a property bubble as an 
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example of a group of eligible assets. Furthermore the IAC highlights the use of a proportionality 
test- “the greater the proportion which the assets concerned represent in the portfolio of the 
bank, the more thorough the restructuring and the remedies to avoid undue distortions of 
competition.”268 In the case of NAMA, as stated above 76% of loans are a direct result of a 
property bubble. This reduces the need for restructuring measures and remedies for the 
beneficiary banks.  The IAC limits the use of open ended State aid by considering only assets 
entered on to the balance sheet of the beneficiary banks by a specified cut off date. This is the 
reason for the seven month NAMA transfer limitation. 
 
4.10.5 NAMA’s Powers 
The Commission in examining NAMA’s legal powers, utilised the MEIP. This is unusual 
because the Commission usually considers the economic position of an undertaking in the 
market rather than its powers on the market. This is an extension to the MEIP. 
NAMA’s legal powers include: 
 1. The power to make an order vesting in NAMA the interest in land. 
 2. The power to compulsory acquire land. 
 3. The right to unilaterally amend contracts.269 
All the powers were found to be distortive to the market as they were outside the norms of the 
market operators. This is problematic as the purpose of NAMA is to restore normal function by 
interfering with the market. Traditionally the Commission would remedy any distortions in the 
domestic market by: 
1. restructuring the undertaking 
2.  fining the undertaking. 
In both cases this would be unsuitable because NAMA cannot be restructured and fining NAMA 
would result in fining the Irish taxpayer. This is a situation the Commission has endeavoured to 
avoid. The Commission could attempt to limit the State Body’s powers. However this would lead 
to a political confrontation between the Commission and the Oireachtas. Again this is something 
both parties would want to avoid. The Commission was appeased by NAMA consulting the 
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Commission on the use of its power. The Commission found NAMA compatible to Article 107 
(3)(b). The Commission launched a formal investigation into Anglo Irish Bank270 on the 31st 
March 2010 regarding the viability of the restructuring plans submitted by Anglo and the Irish 
Government.  
 
4.11 Conclusion 
The application of the proportionality test to a systemic problem under Article 107(3)(b) has 
allowed the Commission to justify the nationalisation and heavy recapitalisation of a firm it 
considers unviable because of an overall social objective; the stabilisation of the financial sector. 
This is dangerously low standard and as demonstrated above has lead to the abandonment of the 
strict policy regulation of State Aid in the financial sector. The Irish Banking Guarantee was 
implemented to restore confidence into the Irish Financial Market. Its purpose was never to 
actually restore any or all of the credit institutions. This is evidenced by the wide scope and the 
€376 billion value of the Guarantee. The combination of the Banking Guarantee and 
proportionality test has forced Ireland to recapitalise several ailing firms. This recapitalisation is 
outside the original purpose of the Banking Guarantee. The implementation of the pan European 
Guarantee Scheme will reduce the need for domestic guarantee schemes. This will ensure that 
any future domestic State aid applications will remain separate and distinct. A member state will 
no longer be able to justify aid through a broad social objective. The State aid will be considered 
in its entirety rather then its effect vis-à-vis a banking guarantee. 
Overall there has been a movement away from the Commission’s traditionally State aid policy 
on the financial sector. However this does not appear to be intentional. It has occurred because of 
the main tools applied by the Commission, the proportionality test and social objective are 
inappropriate mechanisms for use with the systemic problems under Article 107 (3)(b). The 
social objectivity of financial stability results in every State aid application being granted. The 
granting of two recapitalisations, one nationalisation and a further transfer of bad assets from 
Anglo is evidence of the inappropriateness of the social objective standard. By granting State aid 
to several ailing firms, this calls into question whether proportionality can be achieved. This 
limits Ireland’s ability to recoup funds invested into the beneficiary banks. This could jeopardise 
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Ireland financial position. State aid has grown to a point where, the amounts of aid are so 
massive, the ability of member state to recoup the aid is vital to the member states’ viability.271 
The Commission has expressed the view that reckless corporate governance was central to the 
problems experienced by Credit Lyonnais, Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide Building 
Society.  However the requirements of State aid applications do not remedy the initial cause for 
the need of State aid.  The Commission must ensure the use of responsible corporate governance 
at a pre State aid level within a pan European Banking Regulatory Body. This will ensure that 
credit institutions are not as vulnerable to shocks to the market.  
By regulating the cause, the Commission will reduce the number and scope of State aid 
applications. Maes states “we may need to think about bank-specific guidelines, given the special 
nature of systemic crises in the financial sector…..will also depend on regulatory reforms.” 272 
The De Larosiere Report273 recommends the creation of European Supervisory Authority (ESA). 
The ESA will monitor and regulate the banking industry.274 
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Chapter Five  Exit Strategies  
The single biggest difficulty in this area is the uncertainty surrounding the beneficiaries and the 
European Economy. It is therefore impossible to predict an accurate exit strategy for the State aid 
beneficiaries. The Commission views “that although market conditions (of the) EU…financial 
markets have not yet fully normalised…access to funding is no longer a systematic and 
generalised problem.”275 Therefore the role of Article 107(3)(b) for the majority of the member 
states has come to an end. The current issue for the Commission is to ensure proportionality of 
State aid within the Common Market. 
 
5.1 The Viability Report and Exit Strategies  
Stan Maes, head of the Chief Economist Team, European Commission stated in the 
questionnaire that the “exit debate (granting of debt guarantees in particular (and) also bank 
restructuring (monitoring)”276 are the biggest issues concerning State aid. The ultimate aim of 
State aid is to return the beneficiaries to viable enterprises. This is subject to the Viability 
Report.277 Under the Banking Communication discussed in Section 4.1, the beneficiaries were 
obliged to draw up restructuring plans in which they identify problems and devise solutions for a 
return to sustainability. The Viability Report establishes the restructuring plan as the “first step 
in the restoration of viability.” It is not possible to comment on individual restructuring plans as 
they are confidential. The Restructuring Plan must include alternative strategies such as mergers, 
break ups and even liquidations. This is a big progression in State aid Regulation. Traditionally 
State aid was used to return a firm to viability. The idea of liquidating a State aid beneficiary 
appears contrary to this idea. However considering the overall social objective of State aid; 
stabilising the financial sector it is not as alien as first perceived. Despite the proportionality 
issue, the slow controlled wind down of a financial institution would preserve banking stability 
within the financial sector and also rid the sector of an inefficient undertaking. This would return 
the sector to a competitive equilibrium.  
 
                                                 
275
 Commission Notice, The Application of state aid rules to government guarantee schemes covering bank debt to 
be issued after 30th June 2010, Brussels (2010) 
276
 See Annex 1 
277
 Viability Report (2009/C 195/04) (2009). 
  
72 
As part of the exit strategy the Commission requires that the State aid “is either redeemed over 
time…or remunerated according to normal market conditions.”278 This will ensure 
proportionality. As stated above in 4.1.1, the ability of a member state to recoup the aid under 
Article 107(3)(b) is at question. Kelly predicts that Ireland could have a debt ratio of 115 % GDP 
by 2012279, as a result of NAMA and banking recapitalisation State aid.  
The Commission requires any restructuring plan to be implemented as soon as possible and to 
have a maximum life span of five years.280 The danger in codifying the life span is it forces 
banks to sell off assets and this could create a banking assets fire sale. This would undermine the 
stability of the financial market and the ultimate goal of State aid. The Commission therefore 
must balance the stability of the beneficiaries’ vis-à-vis the imposition of proportionality. The 
five year limit is therefore unrealistic. The Commission views it will achieve this balance 
through “adequate remuneration of any state intervention. (This) is one of the most appropriate 
limitations of distortions of competition.”281 This will be achieved through the divesting of 
subsidiaries or branches or customer and business portfolios.282 This ability is also questionable 
as discussed in 4.1. Further to this the Commission requires regular reporting of every six 
months concerning restructuring efforts. This is an extension of traditional State aid reporting. 
The Viability Report also requires external consultancy283 regarding any possible strategies. This 
is akin to the independent evaluation required under IAC Report.284 
 
The biggest difficulty in implementing an exit strategy is that it assumes the economic crisis is 
over or ending. There is no guarantee in this. Article 107 (3)(b) is only used within systemic 
economic problems, such as a recession. However if the recession is to continue further State aid 
might be needed. This would infringe upon any restructuring plans and exit strategies. 
Furthermore any State aid mechanisms exited prematurely might undermine economic stability 
or recovery. 
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5.2  NAMA and the Irish Banking Guarantee Scheme 
The Irish Banking Guarantee Scheme as expressed under the CIFS will expire on the 30th 
September 2010. The Irish Government has indicated a need to extend the Guarantee.285 The 
Commission wants to implement “a process of gradual disengagement from the use of 
government guarantee schemes.” 286 Therefore whilst the scope of the Guarantee will be reduced, 
the membership fee for any guarantee scheme will be increased. 287 This acts as a disincentive for 
undertakings.  The Commission has recommended the use of a banking guarantee cap on State 
aid. If a beneficiary exceeds the cap, it will automatically trigger the requirement of a viability 
review. This however, will have the same problems as the six month restructuring plan required 
under the Banking Communication. The Commission will be financially blind for duration it 
takes to complete the viability review. The ability of the Commission to repatriate the aid could 
also be diminished under Article 107 (3)(b) because of the ‘realpolitik’. No member state would 
allow the withdrawal of State aid resulting in the collapse of an undertaking.  
As stated above, the possible extension of the European Guarantee Scheme288 from €50,000289 to 
€100,000 will reduce the need and impact for a domestic guarantee scheme. This will greatly 
simplify State aid regulation. Member states will no longer be obliged under banking guarantees 
to grant State aid to ailing undertakings. 
 
5.3 NAMA and an Exit Strategy 
The NAMA transfers began on 3rd May 2010 and will continue for seven months.290 It is 
believed that between 20%291-50%292 of the assets transferred will go bad. The remaining 80%-
50% of the assets are viable. NAMA is an unusual “bad bank” because it is transferring both 
good and bad loans. As a result, it has a higher chance of breaking even. Furthermore the burden 
                                                 
285Irish Independent “Lenihan moves to extend guarantee” Dublin 13/06/2009 
<http://www.independent.ie/business/irish/lenihan-moves-to-extend-bank-guarantee-deadline-1772602.html> 
286
 Commission, The application of state aid rules to government guarantee schemes covering bank debt to be 
issued after 30th June 2010, Brussels (2010) 
287
 Viability Report 2009/C 195/04 section 6 
288
 Directive 2009/14/EC 
289
 Commission Directive 20014/EC 
290
 Commission “State aid N725/2009 Ireland est NAMA” 26.2.2010 Brussels at 46 
291Carswell S, “The anatomy of NAMA” 13/11/09 http://irelandafternama.wordpress.com/2009/11/24/the-anatomy-
of-nama-in-the-irish-times/ 
292
 Above n 279 
  
74 
sharing methods, particularly the claw back clause, allows the Irish Government to fine 
beneficiaries in the event of a short fall (as discussed in Section 4.10.3). NAMA has a predicted 
lifespan of eleven years. This is well beyond the codified five year plan under the Viability 
Report. Asset relief management/asset removal schemes are subject to the IAC Report. However 
although the Report outlines exit strategies for the beneficiaries, it is silent on the exit strategy of 
any asset removal schemes (ARS). Ireland was not alone in creating ring fencing mechanisms. 
Therefore the European Commission will have to create a further framework outlining the exit 
strategy for the ARSs.  
 
5.4 Anglo Irish Bank and an Exit Strategy 
The Commission has launched (as stated in chapter four) a formal investigation into the 
restructuring plan submitted by Anglo. The Competition Commissioner has stated “Brussels will 
not rubber-stamp such schemes and may even let banks go bankrupt if those plans do not satisfy 
the Commission.”293 However Anglo is subject to the CIFS and therefore Ireland and the Irish 
taxpayer would be liable for an Anglo bankruptcy.  The Commission will implement the 
proportionality test to ensure a balance of State aid vis-à-vis the Common Market. It is 
impossible for Anglo to reconstitute the State aid quid pro quo. The amounts of State aid exceed 
Anglo’s balance sheet. This is similar to the Credit Lyonnais case, where CL’s State aid 
exceeded its balance sheet in excess of three times (see Section 3.5). In the event that Anglo is 
wound down over a period of time294 in applying the proportionality test it is difficult to imagine 
the recovery of any State aid. This is an example of the social objectivity over powering the 
proportionality test. The proportionality test ensures that State aid is minimal, well targeted and 
proportional.295 Social objectivity justified the use of State aid. In applying both together, social 
objectivity negated the proportionality test. In this way the proportionality test and social 
objectivity only work in harmony where the beneficiary returns to a viable enterprise.   
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5.5 Conclusion 
The uncertainty surrounding the financial sector and the economy make it difficult to predict any 
movement within the area of exit strategies. Currently there are no exit guidelines for ARSs. The 
Commission will have to establish a framework in this area. There are numerous paths open to 
Anglo, the worst case scenario in terms of State aid regulation is the liquidation of Anglo and the 
impact of the social objective of saving Anglo negating the proportionality test. Ireland would 
have to absorb any loss. This would therefore transfer the financial difficulties from the State aid 
beneficiary to the State. The Commission must endeavour to find a balance between the financial 
needs of the economy vis-à-vis State aid regulation.  
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Chapter Six  Dissertation conclusion 
 
Is the European Commission’s recent interpretation of Article 107 (3)(b) a departure from 
traditional State aid policy on the financial sector?  
The historical analysis of State aid mechanisms highlights that the parameters for State aid have 
developed incrementally. The efficiency/equity distinction guided the Commission from 1971 
until the Credit Lyonnais case in 1994. The efficiency/equity distinction was inappropriate for 
the large scale recapitalisation of a financial sector where the stability of the economy was 
paramount. France had to implement a large scale programme of equity to stabilise the economy. 
The Commission justified the recapitalisation of CL using the social objectivity goal of financial 
stability. The Commission reduced the competitive impact of the State aid via the proportionality 
test. This was sufficient for the repeated rescue and recapitalisation of one large financial 
institution under Article 107 (3)(c). This case marked a departure from the tradition approach of 
State aid regulation. 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and the resulting collapse of the Celtic 
Tiger’s property bubble heralded a systemic economic crisis in the Irish financial sector. NAMA 
and the Irish Banking Guarantee were implemented to combat this crisis subject to Article 
107(3)(b). The proportionality test had never been applied under Article 107(3)(b). The use of 
the Irish Banking Guarantee in conjunction with the standard of financial stability obliged the 
Commission to grant every State aid application for rescue and recapitalisation.  
The obligation caused by the Irish Banking Guarantee on State aid will end with the new 
European directive on guarantees in December 2010. Subject to the IAC, a member state will not 
be allowed to exceed the directive’s amount. This will reduce the need for a domestic guarantee 
scheme, thereby simplifying State aid regulation. 
The speed of the applications was such that the Commission was incapable of analysing if a 
viable restructuring plan had been submitted. This is evidenced by the Commission investigation 
into Anglo and Irish Nationwide Building Society. The Commission must ensure that any future 
State aid beneficiaries submit a restructuring/viability report before State aid is granted. Any 
delays preparing the restructuring/viability report can be negated if all firms are statutorily 
obliged to create a restructuring/viability report as standard (similar to a living will). 
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The use of proportionality test is unsuitable where the beneficiary is unviable. Where a 
beneficiary is wound down post State aid injection, the Commission cannot ensure 
proportionality of the State aid. The social objective negates the proportionality test. The 
Commission’s ultimate goal of financial stability is not justified where the financial difficulty is 
transferred via Article 107(3)(b) from the beneficiary to the member state. It appears the 
Commission will grant any and all levels of State aid under the social objective standard under 
Article 107 (3)(b).The Commission has therefore moved away from its traditional restrictive 
approach to State aid in response to the needs of the members state’s extraordinary economic 
circumstances. 
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Annex 1 
Art 107 3 b “to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”?  
1. What in your opinion is the biggest issue of State aid on the financial sector for the 
Member States and/or the European Commission? 
2. The Commission has granted every Art 107 3 b application since 2008 to European 
Union Banks. Do you think the Commission fears fragmentation of the Community 
(political motivation) or a deepening of economic difficulties (economical motivation) or 
another factor if it denies a Member State’s Article 107 3 b application of State Aid to a 
credit institution?  
 
3. The Commission’s economic policy on State aid promotes programmes of efficiency, for 
example the horizontal aid programmes (R&D Aid or Training Aid). Rescue and 
Restructuring Aid to banks are programmes of equity (protecting jobs levels, economies 
etc).  
Do you think State Aid Economic Policy needs to be revised?  
 
4. Estimates of Anglo Irish bank indicate a balance sheet of EUR90 billion but the bank has 
been recapitalized of up to EUR10.4 billion296 and Anglo will be transferring EUR22 
billion of loans to the Irish National Assets Management Agency. This is 20% of Irish 
GDP. 
Should there be a cap on state aid per company? 
 
5. Estimates of the Irish National Assets Management Agency could cost of up to 
EUR32billion. This is 20% of Irish GDP297.  It is now possible to imagine a Member 
State getting into financial difficulty because of State aid obligation. Considering the 
current debt situation in Greece,  
Should the Commission consider the ability of the Member State to pay the State Aid 
when assessing State aid? 
Should there be a cap on state aid per Member State?  
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Annex 2 
 
Eoin 
  
Apologies about the delay in replying. 
  
I am not in a position to respond to your queries as they deal with issues which the Central Bank would 
not be in a position to comment. 
  
I wish you all the best with it and with your continuing studies. 
  
Regards 
  
Neil 
  
  
Neil Whoriskey 
Head of General Secretariat 
Central Bank 
  
+353 1 224 6260 (d) 
+ 353 87 221 9199 (m) 
neil.whoriskey@centralbank.ie 
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Annex 3 
Questionnaire of Stan Maes, PhD,European Commission DG Competition, Chief Economist 
Team 
 
1. What in your opinion is the biggest issue of state aid on the financial sector for the 
Member States and/or the European Commission? 
Exit debate (granting of debt guarantees in particular). Also bank restructuring 
(monitoring).  
 
   2. The Commission has granted every Art 107 3 b application since 2008 to European 
Union Banks. Do you think the Commission fears fragmentation of the Community 
(political motivation) or a deepening of economic difficulties (economical motivation) or 
another factor if it denies a Member State’s Article 107 3 b application of State Aid to a 
credit institution?  
Many of the crisis-related Communications (on bank recapitalization, impaired assets, 
etc.) have an end-2010 deadline, at which point in time we will need to decide whether a 
prolongation of the 107 3 b framework is still appropriate. The referral to 107 3 b is 
largely a legal issue, although it has some economic consequences (banks get more time 
to divest assets to avoid downward price spirals, etc.). Important is that the main "pillars" 
of the economic assessment do not change when comparing bank restructuring under 107 
3 b with the application of the pre-crisis rescue and restructuring guidelines.   
 
3   The Commission’s Economic Policy on State aid encourages programmes of efficiency, 
for example the horizontal aid programmes (R&D Aid or Training Aid). Rescue and 
Restructuring Aid to banks are programmes of equity (protecting jobs levels, economies 
etc).  
Do you think State Aid Economic Policy needs to be revised?  
We may need to think about bank-specific guidelines, given the special nature of 
systemic crises in the financial sector. Not yet decided. Will also depend on regulatory 
reforms. 
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4. Estimates of Anglo Irish bank indicate a balance sheet of EUR90 billion but the bank has 
been recapitalized of up to EUR10.4 billion298 and Anglo will be transferring EUR22 
billion of loans to the Irish National Assets Management Agency. This is 20% of Irish 
GDP. 
Should there be a cap on state aid per company? 
The aid needs to be proportional and limited to the minimum necessary. In case it is not, 
it should be deemed incompatible and should be recouped. 
When a bank receives relatively large amounts of aid (as a percentage of risk weighted 
assets), the required restructuring (burden sharing, competition measures) will be deeper. 
That is how we try to achieve a level playing field across banks and Member States. 
 
5. Estimates of the Irish National Assets Management Agency could cost of up to 
EUR32billion. This is 20% of Irish GDP299.  It is now possible to imagine a Member 
State getting into financial difficulty because of State aid obligation. Considering the 
current debt situation in Greece,  
Should the Commission consider the ability of the Member State to pay the State Aid 
when assessing State aid? 
 
Actually we take the willingness and ability to grant aid into account by ensuring that the 
aid gets remunerated properly.  
Also, the final cost to the state cannot always be equated to the initial investment. It 
depends on the conditions and the viability of the bank post-restructuring.  
 
Should there be a cap on state aid per Member State?  
 
No. The need to grant aid may differ across MS. But the aid needs to be proportional and 
limited to the minimum necessary.  
 
 
 
 
Disclaimer: the views expressed are those of the author and cannot be regarded as stating an 
official position of the European Commission. 
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